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Takings Formalism and Regulatory
Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity
Mark Fenster
A vocal minority of the U.S. Supreme Court recently announced its
suspicion that lower courts and state and local administrative agencies are
systematically ignoring constitutional rules intended to limit, through
heightened judicial review, exactions as a land use regulatory tool.
Exactions are the concessions local governments require of property own-
ers as conditions for the issuance of the entitlements that enable the inten-
sified use of real property. Over the past two decades, the Court has
established under the Takings Clause a logic and metrics for constitution-
ally permissible exactions that require concessions to have an "essential
nexus" and be "roughly proportional" to the harms a proposed develop-
ment is expected to cause. This Article argues that the Court 's suspicions
are well founded but that blame for judicial and administrative noncompli-
ance lies with the Court's bifurcated approach to the Takings Clause. This
approach, which the Court recently reaffirmed in Tahoe-Sierra Preserva-
tion Council Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002), requires cer-
tain types of regulatory acts, including exactions, to be reviewed under a
rule-formalist heightened scrutiny, while the majority of regulatory acts
enjoy deferential treatment in an ad hoc balancing test.
The Supreme Court's formalist efforts in its exactions rules have
failed to impose doctrinal clarity on the deal-making processes of local
land use regulation. What the Article describes as the Court 's takings for-
malism fails to constrain regulatory practices in its intended way and re-
sults in constraints on the variable, locally situated, and intensely political
context of local governance. These constraints include incentives for local
governments to develop preconstituted regulatory formulas and disincen-
tives against individualized, negotiated concessions. These consequences
of takings formalism result in regulatory practices and judicial review that
promote neither the Court's preferred normative vision of strong property
rights protection nor the Court's stated secondary concern for better, more
efficient land use regulation. Most perniciously, the Court's limited doc-
trinal, normative, and utilitarian visions of takings law may block or even
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damage the political and social processes essential to functional and le-
gitimate local governance. Ultimately, the Court's failure in its exactions
rules to impose a formalist discipline on land use regulation throws into
doubt the integrity and legitimacy of takings formalism and the wisdom of
the Court's bifurcated approach to the Takings Clause.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence may well be, as numerous
commentators complain, a confused muddle.' Nevertheless, in its most
recent takings decision, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, the Court confidently declared that its
decisions offered a settled, bifurcated approach to property owners' claims
that a land use regulation's enforcement requires payment of
compensation.2 The general default standard that applies to the majority of
takings claims (one associated most closely with Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City) employs a relatively low level of
scrutiny and balances a number of factors in an ad hoc, open-ended
inquiry. Contrasting this default approach, takings claims that fall within a
limited number of exceptional categories receive a form of heightened
scrutiny that limits judicial discretion and favors the protection of property
rights through clear, narrow rules of decision.'
The bifurcated approach may be settled, but it is not without contro-
versy. In a recent dissent from a denial of a petition for certiorari, Justice
Scalia announced his suspicion that state and lower federal courts are sys-
tematically ignoring or misapplying the Court's approach.5 He voiced two
I. Carol Rose first applied the term "muddle" to the complicated, often confusing appearance of
modem takings law. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984). A recent footnote collected complaints about the muddle and
noted that a comprehensive compilation of such complaints would be "very long" indeed. Marc R.
Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 97 n.2 (2002).
2. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
3. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
4. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321-26; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
The most prominent of these categorical exceptions from Penn Central's balancing test is for
regulatory acts denying all economically beneficial or productive use of land. The Court held, in a
decision authored by Justice Scalia, that such regulatory acts are "compensable without case-specific
inquiry." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
5. Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1045 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). Joining Justice Scalia in his
dissent were Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Some commentators have made similar complaints. See,
e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits ofNollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 477, 492
(1995) ("One of the reasons for Dolan was the hostile response to the lower courts in Nollan."); Ronald
H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Cases on the
State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 523, 555-56 (1995)
(tracking state and lower federal courts' tendency to ignore or blunt the Supreme Court's decisions in
Nollan, Dolan, and Lucas). The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Its application
[Vol. 92:609
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concerns regarding the tension between the "categorical" takings rules and
the default approach to takings. First, courts ignore the clear dictates of
categorical takings rules and instead merely apply a less precise and more
deferential standard. Second, in doing so, lower courts dissipate constitu-
tional protections for property owners and thus dilute the conception of
broad and stable property rights Scalia presumed the Court had firmly es-
tablished.6 The case that raised the Justices' suspicion, Lambert v. City and
County of San Francisco, involved the city's denial of a conditional use
permit that the Lamberts sought to convert rooms in their hotel from long-
term residential to short-term tourist use. A local ordinance required the
Lamberts either to replace the converted units or to pay a portion of the
replacement costs. The Lamberts refused to pay a dollar figure the city had
set based on two replacement cost appraisals. After the city denied their
permit application, the Lamberts filed suit, claiming that the city's refusal
effected a taking of their property.' Affirming the trial court, a California
intermediate appellate court refused to apply the heightened scrutiny of one
of the categorical exceptions to the Penn Central approach,8 which the
Court had developed in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission9 and
Dolan v. City of Tigard,'" and which the Court has continued to endorse as
a "special context" of takings jurisprudence, most recently in City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd."
Lambert, Nollan, and Dolan concerned the judicial review of
"exactions," the concessions local governments have the discretion to re-
quire of property owners as conditions for the issuance of entitlements that
enable the intensified use of real property. 12 Exactions include mandatory
dedications of land, fees required in lieu of dedication, and impact fees
given by property owners in exchange for permits, zoning changes, and
other regulatory clearances. 3 The majority opinions in Nollan and Dolan
declared that exactions must demonstrate both an "essential nexus"' 4 and
"rough proportionality"' 5 to the expected harms that the new use would
cause. A local government's failure to meet either requirement results in a
taking, which entitles the property owner to just compensation. Although-
extends to state and federal government. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 239, 241 (1897).
6. Lambert, 529 U.S. at 1045.
7. Id.
8. See id. For a fuller discussion of the particularities of the disputed issue in Lambert, see infra
text accompanying notes 146-57.
9. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
10. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
11. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 51-60.
13. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 478-79 (1991).
14. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
15. Dolan, 512U.S. at391.
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somewhat inexact, the nexus and proportionality commands require that
judicial review probe more deeply into exactions than the state courts had
in their Nollan and Dolan decisions. Under such an inquiry, the Court
would classify as takings those local land use regulatory practices that it
believes constitute' extortionate demands of property owners. Justice
Scalia's frustration with the state court's decision in Lambert, then, re-
sulted first from what he perceived as the failure of lower courts to apply
the Supreme Court's rule-like principles correctly, and second from his
perception that local governments have continued to use exactions to ex-
propriate or threaten to expropriate private property.
This Article argues, however, that Justice Scalia and his like-minded
colleagues have only themselves to blame for their frustrations. The logic
and effects of the Court's efforts in its exactions decisions to constrain
judicial and local government discretion through a constitutional rule
formalism, 6 and to impose this formal discipline on the unruly, disparate
practices of local land use regulation, have created this judicial
indeterminacy and regulatory variability. In the ten years since the Court
decided Dolan, the doctrinal and regulatory stakes of its exactions
decisions have come more clearly into focus. These stakes include the
narrow doctrinal status of exactions within the baroque universe of
regulatory takings jurisprudence, 7 the impact of the Court's efforts on land
use practice, and the merits of constitutional rule formalism, along with the
16. The term "formalism" has a variety of jurisprudential and historical meanings, invoking such
diverse schools as classical Langedellian conceptualism and constitutional textualism. My use of the
term is quite specific, however. By "rle formalism" I mean a commitment imposing, in the relevant
context of this Article, highly predictive rule- or principle-bound constitutional common law
commands to limit judicial discretion. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1983) (distinguishing between classical legal conceptions of formalism and
conceptualism). This approach correlates with, but is not necessarily tied to, other meanings of
formalism. See Frank I. Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative Rule-Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 934 (1999); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1999). Throughout
this Article, when I use the term "formalism" I mean rule formalism.
17. Nollan's and Dolan's status as either "regulatory takings" or "physical takings" decisions is
the subject of some debate. Compare Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1630, 1651-52 (1988) (arguing that Nollan's
approach may apply more generally to regulatory takings cases) with Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1608 (1988) (arguing that Nollan merely extends the compensation
requirement for unconditional permanent physical occupations to occupations that are imposed
conditionally). If Nollan and Dolan were simply physical invasion cases, however, then the Court
would not have developed nexus and proportionality tests to evaluate whether the invasion required
compensation-the Court would merely have found that an invasion had occurred and awarded
compensation. Moreover, lower courts, with some prodding from the Supreme Court, have increasingly
concluded that Nollan and Dolan apply to nonpossessory exactions, making them appear more like
decisions limiting a wide variety of regulations than merely another prohibition against physical
appropriations without compensation. See infra text accompanying notes 129-37. Because the Court
seems to consider Nollan and Dolan and the land use practice they reviewed as constituting their own
highly specific "special context," the decisions seem to complicate this regulatory-physical taking
binary. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999).
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Penn Central balancing test, to further the aims of the abstract command of
the Takings Clause. Accordingly, the exactions decisions, seen from the
current perspective of Tahoe-Sierra and Justice Scalia's Lambert dissent,
beg the question: Does takings formalism make doctrinal and regulatory
sense?
This Article asserts that the answer to this question is no, based on a
reconsideration of commentary on the exactions decisions, 8 a review of
studies of current land use regulatory practices in California, 9 and a con-
sideration of larger debates regarding rule formalism and vagueness in tak-
ings law generally." Local land use regulators rely heavily on bargaining
or "deal making" with property owners as part of the development review
and approval process, and exactions requiring necessary infrastructure or
appealing amenities are an essential deal-making tool.2' Local governments
developed exactions as a political and administrative means to resolve
highly charged, individualized, and localized disputes fraught with legal,
financial, scientific, emotional, and ultimately political controversy. In this
way, exactions constitute a flexible, open-ended set of conditions that serve
regulatory and persuasive functions by offering both to internalize at least
some of the external costs of development and to make a proposed land use
either sufficiently attractive or minimally unattractive to decision makers
and the voting public. The Court's desire for universally applicable, rule-
like principles conflicts with the complicated, variable, and unstable nature
of local governance and land use regulatory practices. Moreover, takings
rules produce a bevy of unintended consequences and frustration among
regulators, property owners, and other parties interested in fair, effective
land use regulation. Nevertheless, the Court's specific concerns and rheto-
ric about individual property rights and extortionate regulations are not
entirely misplaced. Rather, the Court's efforts to describe and prescribe
exactions so misunderstand the complicated dynamics of land use regula-
tion that they result in variable and unfortunate consequences-including,
ironically, diminished property rights for landowners. Local context, in
other words, often frustrates and complicates constitutional rules.
18. The most prominent critiques of Nollan's and Dolan's logic and consequences are WILLIAM
A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS 341-51 (1995); Been, supra note 13; David A. Dana, Land Use
Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243 (1997); Lee Anne Fennell, Hard
Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2000).
19. The most important recent work in this field is DANIEL POLLAK, CALIFORNIA STATE
LIBRARY, HAVE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S 5TH AMENDMENT TAKINGS DECISIONS CHANGED LAND
USE PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA? (2000). See also Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the
Ground. How the Supreme Court's Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 103 (2001) (reviewing and analyzing data from POLLAK, supra).
20. For a recent thorough review and reconsideration of that literature, see Poirier, supra note 1.
21. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS
104-05 (2d ed. 2000); Been, supra note 13, at 474-83. For a description of exactions within a broader
shift from static to flexible land use regulatory regimes, see infra text accompanying notes 52-60.
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The Court's efforts in the exactions decisions, and in all of the Court's
categorical takings rules, to impose doctrinal clarity in its application of the
Takings Clause to land use regulation have not, and cannot, achieve the
Court's goals of securely protecting property rights and disciplining regula-
tory practices. The exactions rules' failure to achieve the Court's goals,
acknowledged in Lambert by the author of one of those rules,22 demon-
strates that these "judicial devices for putting some kind of stop to the
denaturalization and disintegration of property" 23 cannot provide an extrin-
sic brake to a complicated internal process. To the extent that a universal,
formal clarity for land use law can even be achieved-an assumption that
this Article implicitly disputes-such clarity can be imposed only at great
expense. Lower courts and state and local legislatures in part might be en-
gaged in the overt ideological struggle that Justice Scalia in his Lambert
dissent seemed to assume fuels their resistance to the Court's commands. It
is more likely, however, that courts, legislatures, and regulators are strug-
gling to find acceptable resolutions to complicated land use conflicts-
resolutions made more difficult to craft by the relatively blunt instruments
of the Court's categorical takings rules.
In performing a hybrid doctrinal and consequentialist analysis of
recent empirical evidence and lower court decisions, this Article offers a
critique of how the unresolvable tension between form and practice
inherent in the Court's formalist constitutionalization of exactions operates
on the regulatory ground. The Article's first three Parts introduce the
concept of takings formalism and the most significant (though not
universal) effect of such formalism in local land use regulatory
practice: the development and enforcement of regulatory formulas. Part I
describes the Court's trend toward developing takings rules with limited
applicability as part of its bifurcated approach of categorical exceptions to
the Penn Central multifactor test. Those exceptions, in limited cases, seek
to strengthen property protection and to require administrative precision of
the agencies that regulate land use. Part II describes the Court's decisions
in Nollan and Dolan as establishing one such categorical exception for land
use bargaining. Part III describes and critiques the effects of the Court's
federal constitutionalization of exactions by focusing on local
governments' increased reliance on legislative, formulaic land use
regulatory practices in response to Nollan and Dolan.
Supporting and extending this critique, Part IV argues that the Court's
constitutional rule formalism and the resulting formulaic administrative
22. See Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1045 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
23. Michelman, supra note 17, at 1628. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Diagnosing the Takings
Problem, 33 Nomos 248, 264-66 (1991) (describing desire for stable and understandable general rules
within the liberal ideal of the Rule of Law).
[Vol. 92:609
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approach do not, in many instances, actually further the Court's stated
goals of protecting individual property rights and forcing efficient regula-
tion. On the contrary, they are likely to result in underregulation of land
use in some jurisdictions and more extensive or more rigid regulation in
others. Equally important, Part V claims, the Court's takings formalism has
encouraged regulatory formulas at the expense of individualized, alterna-
tive means for resolving contested disputes over the expected costs of new
development. These alternative means-including open, contentious politi-
cal battles and nonjudicial methods of resolving them-are often quite
messy. The tenor and results of these disputes shift over time as local po-
litical majorities change, new contentious issues arise, the externalities of
earlier projects become more apparent and costly, the economic prosperity
of the community rises and falls, and coalitions formed during earlier dis-
putes remain strong or disintegrate. Enabling and resolving political dis-
putes are essential paths to legitimate, effective decisions within the
disparate and changing local contexts of land use regulation. Bargaining
over individualized exactions offers a means to develop site- and dispute-
specific terms of compromise. Judicial decision making that applies tak-
ings rules, by contrast, considers a single instance and sets stable precedent
for the future that exists outside local politics and that applies equally to all
property owners and all land. But the politics of land use disputes are con-
stituent elements of local governance, and judicial efforts to remove poli-
tics and context from land use are doomed to have consequences that will
disappoint takings rules proponents seeking to protect what they see as
prepolitical property rights. The Conclusion points to the implications of
this argument for the several still-unresolved issues regarding the reach of
the exactions decisions and the viability of the Court's bifurcated approach
to the Takings Clause.
I
TAKINGS FORMALISM AND THE BIFURCATED STRUCTURE
OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
By applying heightened scrutiny to certain categories of alleged tak-
ings, the Supreme Court carved out exceptions to the ad hoc, fact-intensive
balancing approach it established as the dominant test for regulatory acts
requiring compensation in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.2 4 Penn Central requires courts to balance, among other things,
24. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (explaining that in
reviewing regulatory takings challenges, courts generally eschew set formulas and instead engage in
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries"). See also Gary Minda, The Dilemmas of Property and
Sovereignty in the Postmodern Era: The Regulatory Takings Problem, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 599, 612
(1991); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Crosscurrents in the Jurisprudence
of Takings, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 1667, 1681-82 (1988).
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"[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant" and "the
character of the governmental action. 12 5 In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Court reaffirmed the
continuing vitality of Penn Central, declining to apply a formalistic rule as
the default approach to alleged takings.26 Rejecting petitioners' argument
that temporary moratoria on the development of land effect a per se taking
for the period they render the property unusable,27 the Court explained that
its default approach in considering takings claims is to "examine 'a number
of factors' rather than a simple 'mathematically precise' formula. 28
In describing the terrain of the Court's takings decisions, the
Tahoe-Sierra majority distinguished between, on the one hand, claims al-
leging physical appropriation, physical invasion, or regulations that deprive
an owner of all economically beneficial use of land, and, on the other hand,
claims alleging regulations that prohibit a particular use of property but
that leave some value in the property.29 Courts subject the majority of tak-
ings claims, which are of the latter type, to a Penn Central inquiry, whereas
they afford the former type some form of heightened scrutiny. 0 Leaving
aside the nonregulatory instances of physical appropriation by the govern-
ment,31 the two most widely recognized exceptions to the Penn Central test
are government acts that effect a permanent physical occupation of prop-
erty, typically associated with the Court's decision in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.,32 and those that deny an owner "all
economically beneficial [uses]" of her land, as established in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.3 3 Permanent physical occupation consti-
tutes a conceptually narrow and rare outer limit of land use regulation that
25. Id. The extent of the Court's invitation to balance has reached absurd lengths in California,
where the Supreme Court has articulated thirteen different, potentially relevant factors for
consideration, and where courts occasionally weigh all thirteen in the balance. See Kavanau v. Santa
Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860-61 (Cal. 1997) (listing and explaining factors); Massingill
v. Dep't of Food & Agric., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561, 566-67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (applying factors).
26. 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002). See also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)
(reaffirming the Penn Central approach as the default for judicial review of regulatory takings claims);
id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same).
27. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 606.
28. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326 (2002) (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
29. Seeid. at 321-22.
30. See id at 322-23.
31. See id. at 322 (citing as examples United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951);
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373 (1945)).
32. 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). The physical invasion test may not be as simple as it appears,
however. See Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CAN. J.L.
& JURISPRUDENCE 217, 224-28 (1993); see also Poirier, supra note 1, at 108 n.56 (citing cases that
complicate the physical invasion rule).
33. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1991).
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is relatively easy to spot and declare a taking.34 At least in the abstract, the
denial of all economic use is also an easily identifiable outlier that requires
application of a simple command: if the regulation renders the property
valueless, a court must apply a particularized type of heightened scrutiny to
determine whether the regulation effects a taking that requires compensa-
tion.35
Such categorical takings rules operate via discernible dualities-total
versus partial taking, and physical invasion or occupation versus no physi-
cal invasion or occupation. Although not entirely stable or complete, these
dualities promise a number of advantages. First and foremost, for propo-
nents, clear takings rules enhance decisional and allocative efficiency.36 By
offering clear declarations of the extent of property owners' constitutional
rights and limiting the discretion of judges and administrative decision
makers, clear rules ensure fair and value-neutral coherence, regularity, and
predictability across disparate, individual cases.37 As a result, decision
makers waste few resources in applying a simple command to resolve
34. See Maureen Straub Kordesh, "I Will Build My House with Sticks ": The Splintering of
Property Interests Under the Fifth Amendment May Be Hazardous to Private Property, 20 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 397, 436-37 (1996).
35. Nevertheless, the latter category, typically referred to as the Lucas category in honor of the
decision establishing it, is subject to numerous complications. First, Lucas's compensation requirement
for regulations that render land valueless excepts regulations based on background principles of the
common law of property and nuisance that limit the property owner's antecedent rights to use and
develop her property. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. This formulation begs the question of how courts
administer the unknown and possibly indeterminate exceptions that Lucas establishes under which the
government may nevertheless avoid paying compensation despite its regulation's denial of all
economic value. See Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can 't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28
IND. L. REV. 329, 335 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 86-87 (1992). Second, as the dissents and concurrence in Lucas suggest, regulations rarely
reduce a parcel's value to zero, and the regulation in question may not have done so even in Lucas. See
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 1065 n.3 (Stevens,
J., dissenting), 1076 (statement of Souter, J.); see also Wyer v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 747 A.2d 192 (Me.
2000) (holding that where property retains value for "parking, picnics, barbecues and other recreational
uses," a law protecting dunes that prohibits construction on a building lot does not fall within the Lucas
category).
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court may have resolved a third complication-whether land can be severed
into smaller parcels or must be considered as a whole for Lucas analysis. See 535 U.S. at 331 (quoting
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) (declaring that the denominator,
or the parcel under review in an alleged taking, is the "parcel as a whole" rather than the regulated
portion, upholding a series of development moratoria, and in the process making it more difficult for
property owners to be compensated for delays during which their property is denied economic value).
See generally Poirier, supra note I, at 109-11 (summarizing long-standing debates over the
denominator issue and Tahoe-Sierra's possible role in settling them).
36. See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1435, 1449 (2000); Thomas Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 372, 416-17 (1986).
37. See Ross, supra note 36, at 416-17; Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended
Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 638-39 (1999).
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disputes.38 Moreover, property owners and investors who believe that a
rule-bound regulatory regime better protects their expectations than does
an ad hoc balancing test in theory will commit more resources to capital
projects, therefore enabling the highest and best use of property.39
A second advantage of takings rules, according to some advocates, is
that they establish and help enforce increased protection for property own-
ers from the regulatory overreach of local, state, and federal governmental
entities. By providing a doctrinal shield against the intrusive overregulation
of local governments, formal takings rules smooth the "frictions" caused
by the struggles over regulatory indeterminacy and uncertainty, stabilizing
and protecting property rights within the present distribution of property
ownership and entitlements.4 ° Viewed from this angle, categorical takings
tests deploy formal rules to provide a doctrinal shield against the intrusive
overregulation of local governments. Takings formalism thereby furthers a
normative vision and narrative of judicial intervention against an expan-
sionist regulatory state, linking a set of clear rules to a classical liberal con-
ception of broad, static, and well-protected property rights.4'
Underlying the utilitarian and normative claims about categorical
regulatory takings is a jurisprudential desire for formal and doctrinal stabil-
ity. 2 Categorical rules dictate to state courts and state and local legislatures
"the jurisprudential spirit in which their general laws of property and
38. See Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin"': Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 530, 536 (1999); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1178-80 (1989).
39. See Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 36, at 1449.
40. See Epstein, supra note 5, at 490-91. Theoretically, clear rules could be articulated and
enforced in favor of government regulation and against property rights. For example, instead of an ad
hoc balancing test for partial takings, a constitutional takings rule could command that any regulation
that diminishes 90% or less of the value of the subject property does not require compensation. This
rule, too, would provide decisional efficiency, at least in the abstract. But, as in Lucas, litigation would
occur over the remaining value of the subject property. See supra note 35.
41. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, The Liberal Conception of Property: Crosscurrents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, in REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 120, 133-35 (1993); Gregory S. Alexander,
Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1753-54 (1988).
42. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 238-39 (1990); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108
YALE L.J. 1163, 1219-20 (1999); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of
Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1437
(1993). To the extent that the Court has linked its rule formalism to a normative commitment to protect
property rights, it clearly manifests a desire to limit the possibility for judicial discretion that would
undercut property rights. I use the term "desire," whether for rules or for a whole and identifiable
conception of property rights, with its intentionalist, psychological, and psychoanalytic implications.
See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too 143
(1994) (tying formalism's popularity to the appeal of its purported ability to resolve problems and
disputes); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defensor Fidei: The Travails of a Post-Realist Formalist, 47 FLA. L.
REV. 815, 832-33 (1995) (describing the psychological attractions of formalism); Jeanne L. Schroeder,
Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV.
239, 314-19 (1994) (describing the psychoanalytic desire for a discernible conception of property).
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nuisance are to be read and construed. '43 This "spirit" in turn forces states
to establish land use regulatory regimes that take the form of "monadic,
specific rules [rather than] ... complexly interactive open principles.""
But the bifurcated structure of current takings law only partially fulfills the
formalist desire of an occasional majority of the Supreme Court because it
leaves judicial review of the majority of alleged takings untouched.45 The
inroads categorical takings rules make into the takings "muddle"4 6 are lim-
ited, and their own stability may be vulnerable in practice and questionable
in principle. Nevertheless, such rules at least convey "the feel of legality"47
and thus inoculate the presumptively open ground of takings with a "good
dose of formalization. 48
This desire for clarity, precision, and protection has produced excep-
tional and formal rules that depart from default, multifactor balancing tests.
Whether a full-scale retreat from categorical per se rules for takings, 49 a
hesitation to expand the number of such categories, or merely a narrow
refusal to declare that temporary moratoria effect a taking," the six-Justice
Tahoe-Sierra majority at minimum renewed the distinction between rela-
tively bright-line takings rules and multifactor, ad hoc takings tests.
Following Tahoe-Sierra, the Court is not likely to impose rule formalism
on all regulatory takings claims or increase the number of categorical tak-
ings in the near future. Nonetheless, categorical takings rules continue to
operate, and, at least with respect to exactions, have become a central part
of the regulatory landscape of local governments.
43. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and
Judicial Conservatism, 35 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 301, 327 (1993).
44. Id.
45. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council Inc. v. Tahoe Reg' Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322, 332
(2002) (distinguishing condemnations and physical takings from regulatory takings, and characterizing
Lucas as representing a rare departure from the default fact-specific inquiry for regulatory takings);
Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 36, at 1446. See also Gregory S. Alexander, Ten Years of Takings,
46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 586, 594 (1996) (describing the Supreme Court's formalist interventions as
symbolic and of limited application). Molly McUsic has made the most extensive argument explaining
this bifurcation by placing the Court's vision of property fights and rule formalism within the
conservative backlash against New Deal and Great Society programs and the ascendancy of the
conservative majority in the Rehnquist Court. See Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional
Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 591 (1998).
46. See Rose, supra note 1.
47. Michelman, supra note 17, at 1628.
48. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1697, 1700 (1988). See also Michelman, supra note 17, at 1622 (describing a noticeable movement of
the Court "towards a reformalization of regulatory-takings doctrine").
49. See Richard J. Lazarus, Celebrating Tahoe-Sierra, 33 ENVTL. L. I, 3 (2003); Maria E.
Mansfield, Tahoe-Sierra Returns Penn Central to the Center Track, 38 TULSA L. REV. 263, 295 (2002);
Danaya C. Wright & Nissa Laughner, Shaken, Not Stirred: Has Tahoe-Sierra Settled or Muddied the
Regulatory Takings Waters?, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11, 11, 177, 189 (2002).
50. See J. David Breemer, Temporary Insanity: The Long Tale of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council and Its Quiet Ending in the United States Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (2002).
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II
TAKINGS FORMALISM AND THE CATEGORICAL EXCEPTION FOR EXACTIONS
The exactions decisions illustrate the Court's gradual, incomplete im-
position of a more robust form of takings jurisprudence, one that increases
protection for property owners against land use regulations. Like other
categorical exceptions, Nollan's and Dolan's "essential nexus" and "rough
proportionality" tests require courts to apply heightened scrutiny to chal-
lenged land use regulations. Below, I assert that the Court explicitly formu-
lated these tests to protect both property owners as a group and the
classical liberal conception of property itself from the incursion of power-
ful, overreaching government agencies. I associate this move with the
Court's related desire to protect property owners from state and lower fed-
eral courts that, despite the Court's tests, might issue decisions that uphold
local governments' use of exactions to obtain disproportionate or unrelated
concessions from developers. To create a doctrinal shield sufficient to pro-
tect property rights, the Court has attempted to articulate a tight, rule-based
principle to lower courts and government agencies. The exactions deci-
sions' rules attempt to limit exactions to a single purpose: the direct
abatement of nuisancelike impacts caused by the proposed land use. I begin
below with a brief summary of Nollan and Dolan and the context within
which they were decided and extended over time, and then explain how
they are instances of categorical takings formalism.
A. The Exactions Decisions and the Federal Constitutionalization of
Land Use Bargaining
In the past quarter century, planning theory and land use law have de-
veloped a relatively flexible regulatory model.5 This model is more adap-
tive to changes in local market demand and identifiable regulatory need
than the early- and mid-twentieth-century Euclidian model of zoning, in
which local governments classified, limited, and separated uses on broad
swaths of land for extensive periods. 2 Local regulators adapt to changing
patterns in commercial, industrial, and residential uses by allowing
piecemeal amendments and wholesale revisions of their comprehensive
51. See MICHAEL J. MESHENBERG, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF FLEXIBLE ZONING TECHNIQUES 3-4 (1976); Edward J. Kaiser & David R.
Godschalk, Twentieth Century Land Use Planning: A Stalwart Family Tree, 61 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N
365, 372-73 (1995); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as Problem of
Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 879-80 (1983).
52. See AM. PLANNING ASS'N, A GLOSSARY OF ZONING, DEVELOPMENT, AND PLANNING TERMS
94 (Fay Dolnick & Michael Davidson eds., 1999); Ira Michael Heyman, Legal Assaults on Municipal
Land Use Regulation, 5 URB. LAW. 2 (1973), reprinted in THE LAND USE AWAKENING: ZONING LAW
IN THE SEVENTIES 51 (Robert H. Freilich & Eric 0. Stuhler eds., 1981). The term "Euclidian" refers to
the municipal defendant in the 1926 Supreme Court decision that declared zoning to be constitutionally
permissible. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-90 (1926).
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plan. 3 Increasingly, municipalities have come to treat their regulatory poli-
cies (including plans, zoning ordinances and maps, subdivision ordinances,
and variances) less as components of a permanent, fixed scheme and more
as a negotiable set of parameters within which they establish contractual or
conditional relationships with property owners seeking to change the use of
their property." To make significant changes to the existing use of their
land-changes such as subdividing parcels, initiating major development,
or shifting the type or intensity of use-property owners typically must
seek one or more discretionary approvals from the jurisdiction's zoning
authority or legislative body.5 During this process, local governments and
property owners often negotiate over the exactions an applicant will accept
as conditions for issuance of the necessary planning approval. 6
Exactions are therefore an essential tool of flexible land use regula-
tion. They typically require financial or in-kind provision of infrastructure
that will at minimum remedy the proposed project's anticipated negative
impacts and at maximum provide whatever conditions a jurisdiction deems
necessary to persuade it to approve the project. 7 Such concessions may
include dedication of land for the siting of public services or amenities
(such as schools or parks), fees in lieu of dedication, and impact fees to
53. See generally Peter W. Salsich, Jr. & Timothy J. Tryniecki, LAND USE REGULATION: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS & PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF LAND USE LAW 162-75 (1998) (describing numerous
"'innovative' land use controls" developed as responses to the rigidity of Euclidean zoning).
54. See IRVING SCHIFFMAN, ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES FOR MANAGING GROWTH 2-4 (2d ed.
1999).
55. See ALAN A. ALTSHULER & Jost A. G6MEZ-IB.&EZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE 54-55
(1993); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., How the West Was Won: Takings and Exactions-California Style, in
TRENDS IN LAND USE LAW FROM A TO Z 193, 225-26 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2001). Such approvals
take many forms, including the conditional redevelopment permits, code variances, and coastal
development permits that were at issue in Nollan and Dolan. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
377-80 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1987).
56. See DANIEL P. SELMI & JAMES A. KUSHNER, LAND USE REGULATION 161-62 (1999).
57. See ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-IBAI&EZ, supra note 55, at 62-63, 77, 95-96. On the extent to
which exactions require property owners to perform duties and pay fees to cover the anticipated
impacts of rezoning, see James C. Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice, and
Incidence, 50 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 85, 88 (1987). Local governments increasingly rely on
exactions to address a growing infrastructural deficit caused by explosive postwar growth together with
the combination of federal funding cuts, state and federal mandates regarding the extent and quality of
public infrastructure provision, and financial restraints on municipalities brought on by the antitax
revolt of the late-1970s and 1980s. See ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-IBAEZ, supra note 55, at 23-26; Paul P.
Downing & Thomas S. McCaleb, The Economics of Development Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT
EXACTIONS 42, 44 (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987); Arthur C. Nelson, Development
Impact Fees: The Next Generation, 26 URB. LAW. 541, 542-43 (1994); Deborah Rhoads, Developer
Exactions and Public Decision Making in the United States and England, II ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
469, 472 (1994); R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit
Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5-6 (1987).
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fund the provision of public services.58 Another type of exaction, known as
"linkage," seeks to mitigate off-site impacts of an approved development
such as the increased need for affordable housing that might result from
commercial or office development.5 9 Exactions thus shape the physical en-
vironment, generate revenue, force the internalization of external costs
where private ordering is unlikely to do so, and resolve political conflict by
persuading a majority of decision makers or voters that a project is worthy
of approval.60
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's entrance into the field in Nollan
and then Dolan,61 state courts had applied various state statutory and con-
stitutional doctrines to develop differing standards of review for land use
exactions.6 2 Some states, including Illinois and New Hampshire, adopted a
strict "specifically and uniquely attributable" test that required an exaction
to connect directly and to be precisely proportional to the harm created by
the new land use.63 Other states explicitly rejected the specifically and
58. See N.J. Builders Ass'n v. Mayor of Bernards Township, 528 A.2d 555, 558-59 (N.J. 1987);
Been, supra note 13, at 475-76 (1989); Thomas W. Ledman, Local Government Environmental
Mitigation Fees: Development Exactions, the Next Generation, 45 FLA. L. REV. 835, 842-53 (1993).
59. See Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer's
Perspective, 20 URB. LAW. 515, 524 (1988).
60. See ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-IBA.RIEZ. supra note 55, at 7: ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC
CONSTITUTION 286 (2000). Although alternatives to exactions exist, they are unlikely to be either as
financially effective or as politically feasible as imposing exactions. Such other, generally less
attractive means include ad valorem property taxes, see Downing & McCaleb, supra note 57, at 49-50;
special assessments, see ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-IBAfiEZ, supra note 55, at 17; required subdivision
improvements, see Smith, supra note 57, at 6; user fees, see JAMES C. NICHOLAS ET AL., A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES xix (1991); and the common law of nuisance,
see Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use
Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 341 (2002).
61. Before Nollan, the Court had avoided property owners' challenges to exactions under the
federal Constitution on a number of occasions. See Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay,
Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971)
(dismissed due to lack of substantial federal question); Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n of Palm
Beach County, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), appeal
dismissed, 469 U.S. 976 (1984) (same); Jordan v. Vill. of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis.
1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966) (same).
62. See generally John J. Delaney et al., The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating
Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 146-56
(1987) (summarizing differing state approaches before Nollan); Joseph D. Lee, Comment, Sudden
Impact: The Effect of Dolan v. City of Tigard on Impact Fees in Washington, 71 WASH. L. REV. 205,
212-13 (1996) (summarizing judicial review of impact fees in Washington state, where courts used
statutory, takings, and substantive due process approaches). Some state courts had also generally
condemned negotiated land use regulatory acts as impermissible efforts by municipalities to contract
away their police powers, but have increasingly upheld agreements prohibiting such challenges,
especially when states have granted the municipalities the authority to negotiate. See DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 9.11 (5th ed. 2003); SELMI & KUSHNER, supra note 56, at 162-65;
Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development
Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957,
1007 (1987).
63. See Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961)
(adopting the specifically and uniquely attributable test); J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432
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uniquely attributable test in favor of either of two more deferential ap-
proaches. California and a few other states adopted a reasonable relation-
ship test, in which courts upheld exactions that had some reasonable degree
of connection to the proposed development. 64 More commonly, however,
states opted for a more rigorous rational nexus test that considered two re-
lationships 65: that between the exaction and the needs the proposed devel-
opment would create and that between the exaction and the benefits the
development would enjoy.66 Despite the relative deference of these ap-
proaches, neither assured municipalities victory in court.67
A.2d 12, 15 (N.H. 1981) (same). See also Haugen v. Gleason, 359 P.2d 108 (Or. 1961) (holding that a
fee imposed in lieu of land dedication would be unconstitutional unless the money collected was
earmarked to benefit the proposed subdivision); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264 A.2d 910,
913-14 (R.I. 1970) (adopting Pioneer Trust to review park and land dedications). States that have
adopted the specific and uniquely attributable test tend to be those with relatively slow patterns of
growth in the Midwest and Northeast. See Nicholas, supra note 57, at 95.
64. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, 484 P.2d at 610, 611-13, 613
n.7 (adopting the reasonable relationship test and rejecting Pioneer Trust); Jenad, Inc. v. Vill. of
Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966) (adopting the reasonable relationship test); Jordan, 137 N.W.2d
at 447 (rejecting Pioneer Trust in favor of the reasonable relationship test); Billings Props., Inc. v.
Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182, 188-89 (Mont. 1964) (adopting reasonable relationship test and
declaring that a legislatively determined exaction should be upheld unless the property owner
demonstrates that the exaction is unreasonable). See generally William A. Falik & Anna C. Shimko,
The "Takings" Nexus-The Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Planning: A View
from California, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 359, 381-88 (1988) (recounting California's pre-Nollan exactions
cases).
65. See Thomas M. Pavelko, Note, Subdivision Exactions: A Review of Judicial Standards, 25
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 269, 287 (1983).
66. See generally Note, Municipal Development Exactions, the Rational Nexus Test, and the
Federal Constitution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 992, 993-96 (1989) (describing the rational nexus test
developed in state courts before Nollan). These two relatively deferential approaches are difficult to
distinguish in practice. The Utah Supreme Court, for example, has declared its approach to be based on
a "reasonableness" test; however, in practice, the court has considered both the extent to which the need
for an exaction is reasonably attributable to the proposed development and the extent to which the
benefits are demonstrable to, if not solely directed to, the development's future residents. See Banberry
Dev. Corp. v. S. Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 903-05 (Utah 1981).
67. See, e.g., Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n of Danbury, 230 A.2d 45, 46-
47 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1967) (after upholding ordinance requiring dedication of parkland based on
maximum and minimum that did not impose specifically and uniquely attributable test, court
invalidated as unconstitutional a fee imposed in lieu of dedication because the local ordinance did not
require that the fee benefit the proposed subdivision); Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 482 A.2d 908 (Md.
1984) (declaring unconstitutional an exaction imposed under county ordinance requiring a developer to
reserve land indefinitely for a state road because exaction bore no reasonable nexus to the proposed
development and deprived the developer of any use of his land).
In addition, prior to Nollan, state statutes granting municipalities limited authority to impose
dedication requirements and impact fees also played an important role in limiting exactions. See, e.g.,
City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363 (Ala. 1978) (invalidating as beyond
statutory authority fees imposed in lieu of a parkland dedication); Haugen, 359 P.2d at Ill
(invalidating a fee imposed on residential developers in lieu of a parkland dedication because the
ordinance's failure to limit use of the funds to benefit the new homes made the fee a tax, which the
county had no statutory authority to impose). See generally Delaney et al., supra note 62, at 146 n.49
(citing cases in which courts invalidated exactions for lack of statutory authority). Indeed, such statutes
continue to play that role. See Fred P. Bosselman & Nancy Stroud, Legal Aspects of Development
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Thus, when it articulated its federal constitutional standards to evalu-
ate the permissibility of exactions under the Takings Clause, the Supreme
Court established a uniform set of property rights in what had previously
been a diverse, experimental patchwork of state law.68 Its exactions deci-
sions established two tests to evaluate the degree of relationship between
an exaction and a proposed development's anticipated harms. These tests
imposed a heightened judicial scrutiny on exactions, and provided a rule-
like principle for lower courts to apply. They limit the universe of permis-
sible exactions to those that directly address, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, a proposed project's harms.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the first major Supreme
Court exactions decision, involved plaintiffs seeking to demolish and
replace a small, worn-down bungalow on their beachfront property with a
three-bedroom house similar to those of their neighbors.69 The California
Coastal Commission, from whom the Nollans needed a discretionary
permit to build their new beach house,70 conditioned issuance of the permit
on the Nollans' dedication of a public easement across the portion of their
property between the high tide line and their seawall.7 The commission
justified this condition on the grounds that the Nollans' larger house would
obstruct the public's visual access to the beach, increase private use of the
shorefront, and burden the public's ability to traverse to and along the
shorefront. The Court viewed the commission's decision as focusing on the
"cumulative[] burden" of these impacts and the resulting adverse
psychological effects on the public.72
The Supreme Court held that the commission's imposition of this
condition violated the Takings Clause because the easement-which if re-
quired outside the context of a permit application would have effected a
taking for which compensation unquestionably would have been due 73-
lacked an "essential nexus" to the harm created by the proposed building.74
Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 70, 76 (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987);
MANDELKER, supra note 62, §§ 9.11, 9.18, 9.21. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65909(a) (West 2003)
(prohibiting permit approval and zoning variance conditions requiring land dedications that are not
"reasonably related" to the proposed use of the property); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-1-801 to 29-1-804
(2003) (authorizing imposition of "land development charges"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-142 (2002)
(authorizing counties to collect impact fees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-42 (West 2003) (authorizing
exactions for off-site improvements "necessitated or required" by a subdivision seeking approval); TEX.
Loc. GoV'T CODE ANN. §§ 395.001-395.081 (Vernon 2003) (authorizing collection of impact fees).
68. See generally James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, The Impact of a Federal Takings Norm
on Fashioning a Means-End Fit Under Takings Provisions of State Constitutions, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'V 143 (1999).
69. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
70. See id. (citing CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30106, 30212, 30600 (West 1986)).
71. Id. at 828-29.
72. Id. at 829 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
73. Id. at 83 1.
74. Id. at 837.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia suggested that the commission
could have met the test for an essential nexus by requiring a more closely
linked exaction-such as a "viewing spot," a public viewing platform that
would allow visual access to the beach over the top of the development-
but a lateral beach easement had little relation to the harm the commission
sought to address." Under its own regulations and without liability for a
taking, the commission could have denied the Nollans' permit application.
However, conditioning the permit's approval on the Nollans' granting an
unrelated public easement constituted, in Justice Scalia's words, "an
out-and-out plan of extortion" that as such required compensation. 6 Nollan
thus settled two issues: whether exactions as a general matter are constitu-
tionally permissible (they are) and what a specific exaction could require (a
concession bearing an essential nexus, or substantive relationship, to the
proposed land use's harms). It established a logic of harm reduction and a
metric of qualitative connection (i.e., "essential"). Nollan left open, how-
ever, the issue of how much of a concession a government entity could
permissibly require.
Seven years later, Dolan settled this lingering quantitative issue. In
Dolan, the Court considered a property owner's challenge to two condi-
tions the city of Tigard, Oregon, placed on its approval of the plaintiff's
application to expand her hardware store. The city required that she dedi-
cate a portion of her land as a public greenway to mitigate flooding from a
nearby creek and that she dedicate a strip of land adjacent to the floodplain
for a segment of a citywide bike path to mitigate the increased traffic con-
gestion that would result from expansion of the store.77 These conditions,
unlike the beach easement in Nollan, bore an "essential nexus" to the
harms of an expanded store-namely, increases in impervious surfaces and
in traffic created by shoppers driving to the store's downtown location."
Establishing a test it claimed to divine from the variety of prior state su-
preme court exactions cases,7 9 the Court held that the city's failure to dem-
onstrate that the required concessions were in "'rough
proportionality' ... both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development"8° rendered the exactions constitutionally impermissible
without compensation.8 The Court placed the burden of proof on the gov-
ernment entity to establish, with some rough degree of precision beyond
75. Id. at 836.
76. Id. at 837 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
77. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 378-80, 380 n.2 (1994).
78. Id. at 386-88.
79. Id. at 390-91. But see Julian R. Kossow, Dolan v. City of Tigard, Takings Law, and the
Supreme Court: Throwing the Baby Out with the Floodwater, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 231-32, 231
n.86 (1995) (arguing that the "rough proportionality" test had no support in state court precedent and
was newly minted by the Court in Dolan).
80. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
81. Id. at 396.
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simple "conclusory statement[s]," that its proposed exactions would
remedy the effects of the proposed development. 2 Dolan thereby estab-
lished a second constitutionally required metric of exactions under the
logic of harm reduction: rough proportionality between the conditions and
the extent of the project's expected harms.
In the decade since Dolan, the Court has reaffirmed the categorical
nature of the exactions rules without clarifying the rules' applicability to
exactions that differ from those before the Court in Nollan and Dolan.
Unanimously rejecting dicta from the Ninth Circuit regarding the applica-
bility of Dolan to the denial of a development proposal, the Court ex-
plained in its 1999 Del Monte Dunes decision that the rough
proportionality test "was not designed to address, and is not readily appli-
cable to,... questions arising where ... the landowner's challenge is based
not on excessive exactions but on denial of development." 3 When a court
reviews a land use regulation or regulatory act that is "beyond the special
context of exactions," the Court declared in a statement from which no Jus-
tice dissented, the exactions decisions are "inapposite."84 Despite a narrow
definition of exactions in Del Monte Dunes, which seemed to limit nexus
and proportionality to a subset of land use conditions, 5 the Court has split
on a number of petitions for certiorari seeking clarification of the exactions
decisions' reach.8 6 I discuss the issues involved in these disagreements fur-
ther below. 7 As a general matter, the exactions rules remain in place as
constitutional doctrines, although state and lower federal courts lack guid-
ance on, and continue to disagree about, the precise boundaries of the cate-
gory of regulations to which the exactions rules apply.
82. Id. at 395-96. Whether the burden is on the government to prove an essential nexus is
unclear, however, because Nollan did not directly address the issue. See Sam D. Starritt & John H.
McClanahan, Comment, Land-Use Planning and Takings: The Viability of Conditional Exactions to
Conserve Open Space in the Rocky Mountain West After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309
(1994), 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 415,445 (1995).
83. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999).
84. Id. at 702-03.
85. See id at 702 (defining exactions as "land-use decisions conditioning approval of
development on the dedication of property to public use").
86. See Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045 (2000) (Scalia, Kennedy, &
Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (dissenting from the decision not to grant certiorari to consider whether
exactions decisions apply to a refusal to grant an entitlement after the property owner refused an
offered exaction); Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (Thomas &
O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (dissenting from the decision not to grant certiorari to consider whether
exactions decisions apply to legislatively imposed exactions); Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S.
1231 (1994) (vacating and remanding, by a 5-4 vote, a decision refusing to apply exactions decisions to
impact fee exactions in light of Dolan).
87. See infra Part II.D.
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B. Nexus and Proportionality as Rule-Based Principles
Admittedly, the Court's rules governing exactions are less clear than
its rules defining per se regulatory takings as those that result in the total
deprivation of all economic use of land or its permanent physical occupa-
tion. The mere imposition of an exaction does not effect a taking; instead,
courts must apply the nexus and proportionality tests to decide whether
compensation is due. Furthermore, as I explain below,88 the category of
exactions to which Nollan and Dolan apply is subject to a significant
amount of confusion.89 Nevertheless, the decisions represent a similar ef-
fort to create stability and replicable precision for the judicial review of
exactions.9" Like the Court's other categorical takings tests, the nexus and
proportionality tests represent a clear desire to circumscribe judicial discre-
tion in reviewing exactions, and do so to establish broader protections for
property rights and for the integrity of property generally. On the contin-
uum between an impossibly absolute, mechanical rule and an impossibly
indeterminate standard, the exactions decisions lie significantly closer to
the rule.
The Court circumscribed municipal discretion in two ways. First, the
"essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" tests require courts to apply
a prescribed, focused logic to allegedly unconstitutional exactions.91 As
such, they differ strikingly from the comparatively open-ended inquiry of
Penn Central, where the Court admitted its inability to develop "any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government."92
Together, the nexus and proportionality tests consider the direct causal re-
lationship between the harm of the proposed new use for the property, the
regulation upon which the government relies in requiring the challenged
concessions, the cost of the concessions, and the likelihood that the
88. See infra Part lI.D.
89. The Lucas category of takings is also subject to some uncertainty because of issues
surrounding its nuisance exception and the valuation and denominator of the subject parcel. See supra
note 35.
90. See Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 36, at 1446 (associating Dolan with Lucas to the
extent that both attempt to formalize takings law, but do so incrementally and imperfectly).
91. Implicit in my argument is the assumption that when the Court established its federal
constitutional rules to review exactions in Nollan and Dolan, the Court had some choice, including a
more open-ended inquiry that resembled its ad hoc balancing test in Penn Central. See Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1994) (choosing among different state court tests and rejecting the
deferential "reasonable relationship" standard). As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the Court in
Dolan simply assumed that it could adopt any test that state courts had developed-largely based on
state constitutional or unenumerated grounds and generally not on federal constitutional grounds-as
though that were the universe of proper choices for a new federal constitutional rule. See id. at 398-99
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (quoting Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
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concessions would mitigate the harms.93 These tests narrow judicial review
of exactions, focusing on harm causation and abatement as the basis of ex-
actions' constitutional permissibility. Put another way, the Court has de-
clared that exactions to which Nollan and Dolan apply do not require
compensation when they directly address the harms of the proposed land
use, because it is only when local governments so limit their exactions that
they avoid curtailing property owners' constitutional rights. In this scheme,
harm causation and harm reduction serve as both the basis and the limit of
exactions as a regulatory practice. To require something more, or to require
something different, in the Court's view, is to overregulate beyond legiti-
mate land use planning and to effect a taking by going "too far."94 Indeed,
property rights advocates propose extending the rigorous, limiting logic of
this regulatory ceiling to all regulatory takings cases.95
Second, and more significantly, the Court establishes metrics that a
lower court must apply in reviewing the challenged exaction's nexus and
proportionality to the proposed land use.96 Of course, neither metric is ex-
ceptionally clear; indeed, each couples a fairly precise term-in Nollan the
adjective "essential" and in Dolan "proportional"-with an imprecise
one-Nollan's "nexus" and Dolan's "roughly." But these combinations do
not signify the Court's desire to obfuscate or to be imprecise. In Dolan, for
example, the Court explicitly rejected less precise metrics developed in
state courts that required "very generalized statements as to the necessary
connection between the required dedication and the proposed develop-
ment" and were "too lax to adequately protect petitioner's right to just
compensation."97 Although the Court rejected as "too exacting" a strict
"uniquely attributable" test that would have required courts to measure
precisely the exaction against the proposed land use's harms, 98 it neverthe-
less commanded lower courts to measure exactions against a specific stan-
dard. Similarly, the Court in Nollan struck down a condition that "utterly
fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition" and
93. See Jan G. Laitos, Causation and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Why the City of
Tigard's Exaction Was a Taking, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 893, 893 (1995) (explaining that a central
inquiry in Dolan "involves causation: does the exaction relate to the harm 'caused' by the new
development?").
94. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 853 (1987) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
95. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 995, 1044-45 (1997).
96. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 ("[T]he city must make some sort of individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development."); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 ("[U]nless the permit condition serves the same governmental
purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an
out-and-out plan of extortion."') (citation omitted).
97. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389. See supra notes 61-67 (describing pre-Nollan state court tests for
exactions).
98. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-90. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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thus lacked the essential nexus.99 Although wary of establishing a precise
command, the Court clearly hoped to provide some clear, rule-like protec-
tion for property owners. It attempted to do so by carving out specific
judicial inquiries encompassing focused, limited considerations (compare
the condition to the regulatory purpose and measure the burdens of the
condition relative to the impact) and relatively clear, if not quite self-
evident, calculations for courts to make ("essential nexus" and "roughly
proportional").' 0
Nollan and Dolan thus establish takings rules. The argument posed by
one recent commentator, that Nollan's and Dolan's tests are "hardly
beacons of clarity" in form, force, or application, 0' rests on the false as-
sumption that the jurisprudential category "rule" contains only simple,
nondiscretionary, noncontingent commands.' But no such absolute com-
mand can exist. Rules and standards operate in relation, not in absolute
contrast, to each other.0 3 Considered closely, the rule-versus-standard di-
chotomy does not hold"°; instead, commands may be more or less
particularistic and more or less rule-based.' Indeed, neither the Lucas nor
the Loretto takings rule is entirely stable or coherent.'0 6 The exactions deci-
sions provide significantly greater direction and content to courts than an
open-ended, ad hoc balancing or reasonable relationship test,'0 7 and they
therefore demonstrate the same desire for formal stability evidenced in
Loretto and Lucas.'08 A permanent physical invasion effects a taking, total
diminution of value is likely to effect a taking, and an exaction that bears
no essential nexus or that is not roughly proportional to the impacts of a
regulated land use effects a taking.
As takings rules, nexus and proportionality offer numerous advan-
tages, including limited judicial discretion, strong property rights protec-
tions, and allocative and decisional efficiency.0 9  They avoid the
99. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
100. Cf Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 147, 148 (1995) (praising Nollan and Dolan for establishing an "objective standard" to
determine whether a taking has occurred).
101. See Poirier, supra note 1, at 107 n.55.
102. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1700-01 (1976).
103. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 593-
96(1992).
104. See generally Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 383 (1985)
(characterizing the rule-standard binary as performing little more than an "arrested dialectic").
105. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 46 (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES 52, 77-78, 113 (1991).
106. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,426 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 32 and 35.
107. See generally Kaplow, supra note 103, at 621 (distinguishing rules, which give content to the
law before those subject to it act, from standards, which give content afterward).
108. See Heller, supra note 42, at 1219-20.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 36-44.
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discretionary, individualized, and indeterminate realm of standards-based
adjudication, associated with Penn Central, by imposing a rule-like logic
and metrics on future judicial review of exactions. As such, they share with
the Court's other rule-formalist efforts a commitment to clarity, precision,
and property rights protection. The sections that follow describe the intent
of the Court to establish a stable doctrinal shield for property rights, and
the Court's subsequent uncertainty about that shield's reach.
C. Nexus and Proportionality as Doctrinal Shields
The Court majority constructed its exactions decisions to serve as
doctrinal shields that would protect property owners and the integrity of
private property rights against the effects of local governments' unchecked
administration of their police powers. Concerned that local governments
use their monopoly regulatory power to require vulnerable individuals to
cede their constitutionally protected right to exclude others from their
property, the Court assumed in its exactions decisions that property owners
seeking issuance of a discretionary approval were powerless. Property
owners have no option but to agree to the government's conditions, and
they have no leverage to enable a bargain for a better deal."0 The Court
intended to protect property owners from the forced bargains resulting
from the presumptively inequitable distribution of power."'
In Nollan, the Court made this suspicion explicit, characterizing the
lateral beach easement required of the Nollans as "an out-and-out plan of
extortion.""' 2 Finding no relationship between the California Coastal
Commission's stated justification and the means used to achieve those
ends, the Court implied that the government had engaged in little more
than a sleight of hand meant to disguise its strong-arm tactics as a logical
and permissible regulatory act. The exaction's demonstrable illogic, the
Court held, made the extortion plan manifest, and the essential nexus test
uncovered such constitutionally impermissible efforts." 3
The Court's interest in uncovering municipal extortion explicitly ap-
peared in Dolan in its invocation of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine." '4 As the Court described it, this doctrine prohibits the government
110. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86 ("Petitioner contends that the city has forced her to
choose between the building permit and her right under the Fifth Amendment to just compensation for
the public easements."); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42 (characterizing coastal commission's actions as
compelling the Nollans to contribute land to the public when California was required to utilize its
eminent domain power to pay for the land).
111. See generally Fennell, supra note 18, at 15 (describing Supreme Court's implicit distrust of
local governments in its exactions cases).
112. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
113. See id ("[T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building
restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was.").
114. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. See also id. at 387 (quoting Nollan's characterization of exactions
that lack an essential nexus as "an out-and-out plan of extortion").
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from "requir[ing] a person to give up a constitutional right-here the right
to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use-in
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where
the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.""' 5 The rough
proportionality test precludes a forced exchange in which a duplicitous and
untrustworthy governmental entity coerces the property owner to cede the
full complement of rights in her land-a concession that would otherwise
require compensation under the Fifth Amendment-as a condition for re-
ceiving the permit required to intensify the use of that land."6 By imposing
a metric that identifies when a required concession has forced a property
owner to unfairly bear the entirety of public burdens,"' the rough propor-
tionality test extended Nollan's effort to uncover constitutionally imper-
missible exactions. The exactions decisions thereby provide doctrinal
shields that protect property owners who are most vulnerable to the exer-
cise of police powers when local governments, susceptible to majoritarian
influence,"i8 overregulate undeveloped land and exploit individuals and
newcomers.119
115. Id. at 385. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine was also implicitly invoked in Nollan.
See Been, supra note 13, at 473-74; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413, 1463 (1989).
116. 1 assume throughout this Article that Nollan and Dolan are better understood as takings cases
analogous to unconstitutional conditions precedents, rather than as unconstitutional conditions cases
with a takings overlay. The Court's reasoning and analysis in Nollan and Dolan clearly viewed the
challenged regulations as takings and applied the standard test for contemporary takings analysis,
which asks whether the regulation "substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests." See Dolan, 512
U.S. at 385 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), and characterizing required
dedication of easement as akin to permanent physical occupation of land in its deprivation of the right
to exclude); id. at 393-94 (emphasizing that the loss of the right to exclude denied the property owners
one of their fundamental rights); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32, 834-35 (same). They also lacked a
thorough discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Compare South Dakota v. Dole, 483
U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding, in the same term as Nollan, after thorough discussion and application of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, a federal program conditioning highway funding on states'
imposition of a minimum drinking age), with Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (citing only Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972), and Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563
(1968)), and Nollan, 483 U.S. 825 (failing to cite any unconstitutional conditions cases or even naming
the doctrine).
Ultimately, Dolan is best understood as a Fifth Amendment case with some coloring from the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See Fennell, supra note 18, at 45 (asserting that in an exactions
context the unconstitutional conditions doctrine plays a secondary role to the substantive takings
doctrine by serving as a "lens for monitoring the things that the government is attempting to receive
and give"). But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 180-84 (1993) (reading
Nollan as an unconstitutional conditions case providing necessary, but second-best, protection for
property owners under siege from expansive land use regulations that should be, but are not, declared
unconstitutional); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods,
72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 859-60, 866-67 (1995) (reading Nollan as an unconstitutional conditions
case that protects the society-wide benefits of the Takings Clause against expansive regulations that
inefficiently allocate real property resources).
117. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
118. See William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (1988) ("Local governments are more prone to majoritarianism than other
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In addition to its concern with the government's unfair use of its bar-
gaining power, the Court also noted the inefficiencies expected to follow if
the judiciary failed to intervene in the exaction bargaining process.
Commentators likewise have identified the dual concerns of Takings
Clause jurisprudence: fairness and efficiency. 2 ° The dual concern is clear-
est in Dolan, which specifically requires careful, individualized determina-
tions to ensure that exactions "relate[] both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development"; in this way, Dolan limits exactions
to no more than the internalization by the property owner of the external
costs of development. 2 ' According to the Court, this test curbs the gov-
ernment's authority to force property owners to accept a trade whose costs
to them are greater than the benefits provided to the public.' Nollan relied
on the same claim. In the absence of judicial intervention, the Court as-
sumed, municipalities would increase their bargaining leverage by produc-
ing more stringent land use regulations, only to waive them in exchange for
even more beneficial, unrelated amenities. 123 Local governments thus
would realize fewer of the land use goals they purportedly sought to meet
than if they imposed more lenient but nontradable development restric-
tions. 124 The Court assumed that, in the absence of judicial intervention, a
local government would extort property from their citizens while harming
all of the jurisdiction's property owners and residents by strategically bar-
gaining away their regulations. The Court sought to protect the regulators,
levels of government because they usually lack the electoral diversity that comes with large land area
and large population and because, as derivative governments, they also lack the other constitutional
checks on the will of the majority, such as bicameral legislatures and separation of powers."). See also
FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 139 (observing that legislation by the national legislature should be given
higher judicial deference than local legislative acts because it is less susceptible to majoritarian
capture).
119. Mark W. Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts ofInterest in Zoning Decisionmaking, 65 N.D.
L. REV. 161, 195 (1989) (arguing that the land use regulatory process is especially susceptible to bias
among large, homogenous factions).
120. See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings,
112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 998-99 (1999). See also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1181-82 (1967) (relying on normative criteria of allocative efficiency and distributive justice to
judge collective action). Courts more typically emphasize the fairness rationale, however. See
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001) (stating that the Takings Clause is intended to
prevent government from "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole" (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49)); City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) ("[C]oncems for
proportionality animate the Takings Clause .... ); Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528-29
(1998) (plurality opinion) (finding a regulatory taking where the retroactive burden was "substantially
disproportionate to the parties' experience").
121. Dolan, 512U.S. at391.
122. See id. at 393-95 (evaluating conditions required of the Dolans and concluding that each
requires too much in light of the impacts of the proposed development).
123. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 n.5 (1987).
124. Id.
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the regulated, and affected third parties alike from local governments'
overreaching, rent-seeking tendencies.125
D. The Uncertain Reach of the Exactions Decisions
As the Court clarified unanimously in its 1999 City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. decision, the heightened scrutiny of its ex-
actions decisions applies only in the "special context of exactions" and
does not extend to decisions to deny applications for discretionary approv-
als.126 As such, exactions were reaffirmed as a finite category of land use
regulations excepted from the default Penn Central approach to takings
claims. Despite this distinction between exactions-based regulatory acts
and acts that lack conditions, the applicability of heightened scrutiny across
the wide spectrum of exactions is not entirely certain.'27 Understandably,
the reach of the exactions decisions is significant for interested parties.
When the federal Constitution's heightened scrutiny does not apply, courts
review challenged exactions under their own, often more deferential,
tests,'28 meaning property owners may be less likely to win.
Three central issues regarding the exactions decisions' reach remain
unclear. First, neither Nollan nor Dolan resolved whether the essential
nexus and rough proportionality tests apply only to the category of exac-
tions requiring dedication of land for public use or whether they extend to
exactions such as impact fees (charges for the anticipated impacts of a pro-
ject on infrastructure systems, with the fees collected used to mitigate those
125. See Been, supra note 13, at 491 ("Requiring a local government to spend exactions on
projects that are germane to the harm that the development causes limits the potential profit from
overregulation and thereby helps to ensure the efficient level of regulation."). One of the strongest and
most influential arguments doubting the ability and willingness of local governments to regulate fairly
and efficiently is Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977).
126. 526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999) (declaring that Dolan was "not designed to address,
and ... [was] not readily applicable to, the much different questions arising where, as here, the
landowner's challenge is based not on excessive exactions but on denial of development"); id. at 733
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the use of the Dolan standard "for
reviewing land-use regulations generally"). Although not a clear distinction-as Richard Epstein has
argued, any land use regulation can be described as an exaction to the extent that it forbids or limits a
particular land use while enabling others-the Court in Del Monte Dunes explicitly declared the
difference between stated and implied conditions of development to be constitutionally significant. See
EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 20.
127. See generally David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How
Perspectives on Property Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and
Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523, 567-74 (1999) (describing open issues
prior to Del Monte Dunes); Edward H. Ziegler, Development Exactions and Permit Decisions: The
Supreme Court's Nollan, Dolan, and Del Monte Dunes Decisions, 34 URB. LAW. 155, 161-64 (2002)
(describing issues resolved and left open by Del Monte Dunes).
128. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel Ltd. P'ship v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105
(Cal. 2002) (finding that, where Nollan and Dolan do not apply, courts should review an exaction for
its "reasonable relationship, in both intended use and amount, to the deleterious public impact of the
development").
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impacts) or other concessions that do not require the dedication of land,
such as fees paid in lieu of land dedication.' 29 The Court in Del Monte
Dunes noted that none of its decisions had extended Dolan beyond exac-
tions requiring the dedication of property. 3 ° This distinction is consistent
with the Court's repeated statements, in Nollan and in other takings cases,
that land dedications demand more careful judicial review because of the
"heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective."'' Some state
and lower federal courts have relied on that distinction in refusing to ex-
tend heightened scrutiny to nonpossessory exactions, such as cash reloca-
tion assistance to displaced tenants, traffic impact fees, and open space
allotments for future residents of a subdivision.' At the same time, a sig-
nificant number of courts have applied heightened scrutiny to nondedica-
tory exactions used in individualized proceedings.' 3
129. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (distinguishing Dolan, in
which the challenged exaction required the property owner to dedicate part of her land to the city, from
other regulatory takings cases applying different standards of review, in which the challenged
regulations imposed conditions that were "simply a limitation on the use" the property owners could
make of their land). On the confusion in state and lower federal courts prior to Del Monte Dunes over
whether Nollan and Dolan applied to exactions requiring something other than the dedication of land,
see Nancy E. Stroud, Note, A Review of Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey and Its Implications for
Local Government Exactions, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 195, 203-05 (1999).
130. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702 (limiting application of heightened scrutiny to those
conditions for approval that require "the dedication of property to public use"). But see Isla Verde Int'l
Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 990 P.2d 429, 436 n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that
statements in Del Monte Dunes limiting Dolan to exactions requiring dedications of land were dicta),
aff'd on other grounds, 49 P.3d 867 (Wash. 2002); Bruce W. Bringardner, Exactions, Impact Fees, and
Dedications: National and Texas Law After Dolan and Del Monte Dunes, 32 URB. LAW. 561, 582
(2000) (asserting that the Del Monte Dunes statement was dicta and further arguing that the distinction
between dedicatory and nondedicatory exactions is meaningless).
131. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987). Accord Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (distinguishing permanent physical invasions, "no matter how
minute the intrusion," from other land use regulations, unless the latter deny "all economically
beneficial or productive use of land").
132. See, e.g., Gameau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Nollan and
Dolan do not apply to an ordinance requiring landlords to provide cash relocation assistance to tenants
displaced as a result of redevelopment); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir.
1995) ("Nollan and Dolan are best understood as extending the analysis of complete physical
occupation cases to those situations in which the government achieves the same end (i.e., the
possession of one's physical property) through a conditional permitting procedure."); McCarthy v. City
of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (holding that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to traffic
impact fee ordinance); Henry v. Jefferson County Planning Comm'n, 148 F. Supp. 2d 698, 709 n. 142
(N.D. W. Va. 2001), aff d in part, vacated in part, 2002 WL 864267 (4th Cir. 2002) (unpublished
opinion) (refusing to apply Dolan to use permit conditions that did not involve dedication of land for
public use). Recently, the Maryland Supreme Court made an even finer distinction: Dolan applies to
required dedications of land in which the land is made open to the public generally but not to required
dedications that would be open only to the future residents of the subdivision for which the exaction
was to be required. See City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 745 A.2d 1000 (Md. 2000).
133. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that Nollan and Dolan "apply, under the circumstances of this case, to the monetary
exaction imposed by Culver City as a condition of approving plaintiff's [rezoning] request"); Town of
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Despite the Court's emphasis in Nollan and Dolan on forced dedica-
tion, it decided, by a 5-4 margin, to remand to the California Supreme
Court the California Court of Appeals decision in Ehrlich v. City of Culver
City,3 4 which applied a relatively low standard of review to impact fee ex-
actions. The Court directed the California court to review the decision in
light of Dolan.' Although the Court has not yet faced the issue directly,
its remand of Ehrlich and lower federal and state court decisions (including
the California Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Ehrlich on re-
mand)'36 may have settled the issue in favor of extending Nollan and Dolan
to nonpossessory exactions such as impact fees.'37 Perhaps, in the end, the
Court's apprehension over the vulnerability of property owners has over-
taken its concern for the uniqueness and integrity of real property owner-
ship rights. On the other hand, the Del Monte Dunes dicta associating the
exactions cases solely with dedications leaves sufficient ambiguity to keep
the issue open.
A second unresolved issue is whether the essential nexus and rough
proportionality tests apply only to exactions imposed by adjudicative deci-
sions regulating individual pieces of land or whether they extend also to
legislative decisions regulating an entire jurisdiction or large units
thereof.' This distinction, which is harder to discern in the smaller, less
Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 71 S.W.3d 18, 34 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (applying Nollon
and Dolan to exaction requiring improvements to public street); Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle
Ground, 972 P.2d 944, 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that Nollan and Dolan apply "where the
City requires the developer as a condition of approval to incur substantial costs improving an adjoining
street"), aff'd on other grounds, 49 P.3d 860 (Wash. 2002).
134. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), vacated, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994), appeal after
remand, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 929 (1996).
135. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994).
136. 911 P.2d at 433.
137. See generally Stroud, supra note 129, at 202-06 (discussing the split among courts on this
point and possible implications of Del Monte Dunes). Commentators arguing against the possessory-
nonpossessory distinction include J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the "Essential Nexus ": How
State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 397-401 (2002); Callies, supra note 127, at 571-72; Mark W. Cordes, Legal
Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 513, 540-
43 (1995); Kmiec, supra note 95, at 1036-37. Some commentators propose a test for challenges to
impact fees based on substantive due process rather than the Takings Clause. See Julian C.
Juergensmeyer & James C. Nicholas, Impact Fees Should Not Be Subjected to Takings Analysis, in
TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES 357, 359-63 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002) (citing Hollywood, Inc.
v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 609-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)) (arguing for a due process-
based dual rational nexus test that would consider whether there was a reasonable connection between
first, the locality's need for additional capital facilities and the new development and second, the funds
collected and the benefits accruing to the new development).
138. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (distinguishing between challenges to "essentially legislative
determinations classifying entire areas of the city," and the challenges reviewed in Dolan (and, by
implication, Nollan), which were to "adjudicative decision[s] to condition petitioner's application for a
building permit on an individual parcel"). See also id. at 391 n.8 (noting that judicial review of "an
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual parcel"
applies heightened scrutiny and places the burden on the government entity to prove that an exaction
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formal governmental structures of municipalities than in federal and state
governments,139 assumes that the Takings Clause is most likely to be impli-
cated when an individual is singled out through an adjudicative-type act by
a government agency. Regulations affecting large segments of the public
less commonly implicate the Takings Clause.'4° In addition, because a leg-
islatively enacted exaction provides for regulatory certainty, it is less likely
to frustrate property owners' investment-backed expectations.1 ' Shortly
after Dolan, the Court denied certiorari in a case in which the Georgia
Supreme Court refused to apply heightened scrutiny in its review of land
use regulations imposed by a zoning ordinance. 142 Lower federal and state
courts tend to respect this adjudicative-legislative distinction and extend
the nexus and proportionality tests only to individualized exactions,
143
did not effect a taking, as opposed to judicial review of "generally applicable zoning regulations,"
which proceeds under a more relaxed scrutiny with the burden on the property owner to demonstrate
that the exaction constitutes a taking).
139. See Laurie Reynolds, Local Subdivision Regulation: Formulaic Constraints in an Age of
Discretion, 24 GA. L. REV. 525, 544-49 (1990); Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between
Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 260-61
(2000). In the smaller setting of local government, where greater access to representatives can help
political minorities or individuals to overcome political majorities and where affected parties may have
more constitutional due process protections, adjudicative procedures can often protect individuals'
property rights better than legislative procedures can. See Reznik, supra, at 272-73. Indeed, the
exactions reviewed in both Nollan and Dolan could be understood as broadly applicable rather than as
individualized adjudications, as the majorities in both cases seem to treat them. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at
413 n.* (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The majority characterizes this case as involving an 'adjudicative
decision' to impose permit conditions,.., but the permit conditions were imposed pursuant to Tigard's
Community Development Code. The adjudication here was of Dolan's requested variance from the
permit conditions otherwise required to be imposed by the Code.") (citations omitted); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 829 (1987) (noting that the coastal commission had placed similar
conditions on "43 out of 60 coastal development permits along the same tract of land and that of the 17
not so conditioned, 14 had been approved when the Commission did not have administrative
regulations in place allowing imposition of the condition, and the remaining 3 had not involved
shorefront property."). State courts seem quite capable of making fine distinctions between legislated
and individualized exactions, however. Compare Dudek v. Umatilla County, 69 P.3d 751 (Or. Ct. App.
2003) (applying Dolan to a legislatively adopted exaction scheme where the ordinance grants discretion
to the county to determine the extent of the exaction), with Rogers Machinery, Inc. v. Washington
County, 45 P.3d 966, 968 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to apply the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and
Dolan to a legislatively determined "system development charge" of traffic impact fees levied by a
local government under the authority of a state statute).
140. See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1348 (1991).
Accordingly, as Lee Anne Fennell has noted, the distinction between legislative and adjudicative
decisions continues to retain both logical coherence and conceptual importance given the distinction the
Court stressed in Del Monte Dunes between exactions and development denial. See Fennell, supra note
18, at 10-11.
141. See Dana, supra note 18, at 1261 n.92; Douglas R. Porter, Will Developers Pay to Play?, in
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 73, 76 (Arthur C. Nelson ed., 1988); see also George Wyeth, Regulatory
Competition and the Takings Clause, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 87, 131 n.136 (1996) (arguing that
competitive pressures among jurisdictions will also make it less likely that municipalities will effect
takings through legislative acts than through individualized, site-specific regulation).
142. Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995) (denying certiorari).
143. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz.
1997) (refusing to extend Dolan to a legislative water resources development fee); San Remo Hotel
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although some courts, with the approval of some commentators, have nev-
ertheless applied heightened scrutiny to legislatively enacted exactions.'
44
Two Justices agreed with this approach in their dissent from the Court's
denial of certiorari, attacking the adjudicative-legislative distinction as un-
clear, illogical, and essentially meaningless.'45
Third, it is unclear whether a government's exaction proposal made
during the application review process may be subject to heightened scru-
tiny, even if the property owner rejects the proposed exaction or the gov-
ernment withdraws it.' 46 This situation differs from the exactions before the
Court in Nollan and Dolan, where the municipalities had issued approvals
subject to conditions and the property owners had assented to, or at least
were informed of, the exaction that would be required.1 4 1 In the case of re-
jected or withdrawn exactions, by contrast, the municipality denies a prop-
erty owner's application after offering conditions that the property owner
refused. The two courts that considered the issue reached different
Ltd. P'ship v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 103 (Cal. 2002) (refusing to extend
Nollan and Dolan to a generally applicable fee for converting residential hotel rooms); Krupp v.
Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 697 (Colo. 2001) (refusing to apply Dolan to, and
subsequently upholding, generally applicable sewer fees); Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington,
552 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to apply Dolan to, and subsequently upholding,
a generally applicable ordinance requiring mobile home park owners closing their parks to pay
relocation costs to park residents); Rogers Machinery, 45 P.3d at 966 (refusing to apply the heightened
scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan to a legislatively determined system development charge of traffic impact
fees levied by local government under authority of state statute).
144. See Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. v. South Dakota, 236 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1026-29 (D.S.D. 2002)
(applying Nollan and Dolan to state eminent domain statute requiring private railroads that use statute
to acquire land to grant easement to other public entities and groups); Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton
and Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000) (applying Nollan and Dolan to
a system of impact fees imposed on developers for financing roads); Lincoln City Chamber of
Commerce v. City of Lincoln City, 991 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (applying Nollan and
Dolan to an ordinance requiring dedications, improvements, or fees for roads, drainage facilities, and
other infrastructure as conditions for issuance of a building permit); Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v.
City of Camas, 990 P.2d 429, 429 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (applying Nollan and Dolan to ordinance
requiring all development to set aside a fixed percentage of land for open space), aff'd on other
grounds, 49 P.3d 860 (Wash. 2002). For approving commentary, see for example, Breemer, supra note
137, at 401-07 (arguing that, whether understood as relying on the Takings Clause or the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, Nollan and Dolan should apply to both legislative and
adjudicative exactions).
145. See Parking Ass'n, 515 U.S. at 1116 (Thomas & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
146. This was the issue raised by the petition for certiorari denied in Lambert v. City and County
of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045 (2000). See also supra text accompanying notes 5-11 (discussing
dissent from petition for certiorari). See generally Andrew W. Schwartz, The Application of
Nollan/Dolan Heightened Scrutiny to Legislative Regulations and "Unsuccessful Exactions,"
Regulatory Takings Conference, Oct. 1999, Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute,
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/conference/schwartz.htm.
147. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379, 381 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987). See also Dana, supra note 18, at 1290 ("[T]he developer's pre-construction
assent to unconstitutional conditions does not constitute a waiver of the right to challenge them at a
later date.").
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conclusions.'48 The argument in favor of applying the Court's exactions
decisions to rejected or withdrawn exactions asserts that if courts apply
different tests depending upon whether the exactions are accepted by both
parties and finalized in an approval, municipalities will offer an exaction
that is politically popular and then, if the property owner refuses it, with-
draw the offer and deny the application. 49
But significant distinctions between exactions attached to an approval
and exactions that do not become obligations for a property owner should
affect how courts review these takings claims. A local government is likely
to present numerous reasons for denying a property owner's development
application. Unless the municipality (foolishly) states in the record of its
review that its denial is based upon the refused exaction offer rather than
on the unmitigated impacts of the proposed project, 5 ' a court will find it
difficult to distinguish a municipality's unconstitutional purpose from its
permissible ones.' 5' And yet, in his Lambert dissent, Justice Scalia would
have required courts not only to focus specifically on the rejected exaction
but to use it as a basis for awarding compensation.1
5 2
A court will also struggle to determine a remedy for a property owner
who demonstrates that the exaction she refused prior to the municipality's
denial fails under heightened scrutiny. In Nollan and Dolan, the Court
merely required compensation for certain unconstitutional conditions
attached to permit approvals; to provide an adequate remedy for the
property owner in a rejected exaction case, by contrast, a court must
reverse a permit denial, despite the existence of legitimate reasons for a
denial that may or may not be in the record. The Eighth Circuit faced
148. See Goss v. City of Little Rock (Goss 1), 90 F.3d 306, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1996); Lambert v.
City and County of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 568-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), superseded by
950 P.2d 59 (Cal. 1998). In Goss I, the Eighth Circuit held that Dolan could apply to the city's denial of
an application to rezone property after its owner refused the city's condition that he deed a portion of
his land to the city to widen an adjacent road. In Lambert, by contrast, an intermediate appellate court
in California held that a city's denial of a conditional use permit should not be reviewed under the
heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan despite evidence in the record showing that the city would
have issued the permit if owners had agreed to pay an impact fee. Three sitting justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court considered this issue worthy of certiorari review in 2000. See Lambert, 529 U.S. at
1045 (Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy, dissenting from denial of certiorari).
149. See Lambert, 529 U.S. at 1045 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that there is no
logical reason to treat differently "the grant of a permit subject to an unlawful condition and the denial
of a permit when an unlawful condition is not met," because they are each examples of extortionate
conditions illegally offered by the state. Therefore, heightened scrutiny should apply equally to both.
Id. (citing Lambert, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 569 (Strankman, J., dissenting)).
150. See Goss 1, 90 F.3d at 309-10 (remanding to city to find legitimate reason for denying
permit).
151. See, e.g., Lambert, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 567 (listing city's findings supporting its denial of
conditional use permit, including that the proposed conversion would be incompatible with the city's
Master Plan and with the building's surrounding neighborhood, and "would be injurious to property,
improvements or potential development").
152. See Lambert, 529 U.S. at 1045 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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precisely this issue when the case returned on appeal from the court's
earlier remand in Goss L53 In Goss II, the circuit court reversed the district
court's order to issue an approval and instead allowed the city to utilize the
available legitimate planning rationales to support its denial of the rezoning
application. 54 Although the court denied that its application of heightened
scrutiny and its finding of a taking in the rejected exaction was a Pyrrhic
victory for the property owner, the property owner received no
compensation for the taking he apparently suffered, at least temporarily,
while the rejected exaction remained the basis of the city's denial.
A property owner may be able to receive compensation for a temporary
taking effected during the period between the unconstitutional denial and a
correct, constitutional denial based on legitimate reasons. It appears that
the temporary takings issue was not before the court in Goss II, although
the court did grant attorney's fees to the plaintiff under 43 U.S.C.
§ 1983.155 How, under the Takings Clause, can a court require
compensation for a regulatory act that was not imposed? Justice Scalia
never reached this issue in his Lambert dissent, stating only that if a
jurisdiction clearly based its denial on a refused exaction, he would
"remand for conduct of the Nollan-Dolan analysis." '156 He provided no
guidance or insight as to a prevailing plaintiffs remedy following that
analysis.
More important, if lower courts review both rejected exactions and
permit denials resulting from failed negotiations with the same heightened
scrutiny, then they will contradict recent Supreme Court pronouncements
that exactions and outright denials pose "much different" questions.57
Extending constitutional exactions rules to all conditions-whether or not
property owners accepted them and whether or not the governing board
issued an approval-would extend the categorical exception of Nollan and
Dolan to most land use regulatory decisions, given the prevalence of such
negotiations and discussions in the land use process. Indeed, Justice
Scalia's suggested approach in Lambert of applying the nexus and propor-
tionality tests to withdrawn or rejected exactions would begin to swallow
the distinction between the categorical takings approach of the exactions
decisions and the Penn Central multifactor test. Plaintiffs would simply
claim that the underlying reason for the denial of their development appli-
cation was their refusal of a proposed exaction. Local governments, in turn,
would become exceedingly wary about offering, or even discussing, condi-
tions on development, thereby harming not only communities that would
153. Goss v. City of Little Rock (Goss I1), 151 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 1998).
154. Id. at 864.
155. See id. at 866.
156. Lambert, 529 U.S. at 1045 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999).
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approve development without conditions, but also property owners who
would face summary denials without the opportunity to bargain.
In establishing a new category of heightened scrutiny for takings
claims, Nollan and Dolan combine doctrinal force-property rights protec-
tions cloaked in the security of a constitutional rule formalism-with an
uncertain, potentially expansive scope. The exactions decisions thus illus-
trate the logic and flaws of the bifurcated approach by requiring heightened
scrutiny of particular types of regulatory acts on the assumption that some
acts are more likely than others to result in uncompensated takings. But the
distinctions upon which this logic rests threaten to break down and leave
all regulations vulnerable to heightened scrutiny. And nexus and propor-
tionality tests, as well as the indeterminacy of their applicability, have
enormous, variable consequences on land use regulation. Indeed, this para-
dox of powerful clarity and indeterminate scope has affected land use regu-
lation in important ways, as the remainder of the Article explains.
III
CONSTITUTIONAL EXACTIONS AND REGULATORY FORMULAS
In the years following Nollan and Dolan, state and local governments
have tended to move away from negotiated, ad hoc exactions and toward
legislated, fee-based formulas as a preconstituted remedy for the harms and
costs of development proposals. The combined clarity and indeterminacy
of the Court's exactions decisions give local governments strong incentives
to adopt such formulas to avoid or successfully defend against constitu-
tional challenges. This Part first describes the costs and practical difficul-
ties of complying with the Court's takings rules and then explains how
regulatory formulas offer a solution that helps achieve fairness, regulatory
precision, and administrative efficiency. It concludes with a critique of the
Court's formalist approach to exactions.
A. The Costs and Difficulties of Compliance
The exactions cases have affected substantive decision making and
the costs of the regulatory review process in at least some jurisdictions.'58
158. See POLLAK, supra note 19, at 31, 82-83; Jonathan Davidson & Adam U. Lindgren,
Exactions and Impact Fees-Nollan/Dolan: Show Me the Findings!, 29 URB. LAW. 427 (1997); Ryan,
supra note 60, at 368. Such costs may be borne by, or shared with, the property owner, thereby raising
the cost of development. See id at 366; cf Lincoln City Chamber of Commerce v. City of Lincoln City,
991 P.2d 1080, 1080 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding city ordinance requiring land owner-applicant to
submit civil or traffic engineer's report demonstrating that applicant could not be required to provide
road, drainage, and sidewalk easements for land improvements, because such requirements would not
be roughly proportional to the estimated impact of the development). One guide for land use attorneys
suggests that counsel for developers or property owners hire their own economic consultants in
preparation for litigation over the essential nexus and rough proportionality of any exaction required in
the approval or development agreement process. Michael C. Spata, Decision-makers and the
Administrative Decision, in How To LITIGATE A LAND USE CASE 55, 61 (Larry J. Smith ed., 2000).
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Because they can apply to exactions imposed as part of a wide variety of
land use regulations, including subdivision approvals, rezoning, and an-
nexation, 5 9 the exactions decisions have prompted regulatory changes that
seek to reduce takings liability. These changes have been especially note-
worthy in some contexts-namely, states that had previously engaged in
more deferential judicial review of exactions, local governments that failed
to comply with the nexus and proportionality tests, and local governments
that developed constitutionally permissible exactions but failed to produce
a sufficiently detailed record to demonstrate nexus and proportionality. 6 °
Nollan and Dolan have raised the risk of litigation and the incidence
of property owners' threats to sue.' 6 ' A recent study of city and county
planners in California found that litigation threats have increased since
Nollan, Dolan, and other takings cases expanded the compensation rights
of property owners subjected to regulation. 162 California counties with
strong growth controls and the fastest-growing California cities have faced
more threats of litigation than have progrowth counties and slower-
growing cities. 163 Local governments bear the full risk"6 of compensating
the property owner for an exaction found to be unconstitutional and for
attorney's fees. 165  They may also be liable for compensation for a
"temporary taking" for the period dating back to the imposition of the pro-
hibited exaction. 166 Even accepting a condition proposed by an applicant
for a discretionary approval may be risky, as one Idaho county recently
159. See generally Jonathan M. Davidson et al., "Where's Dolan?" Exactions Law in 1998, 30
URB. LAW. 683, 684-86 (1998).
160. See generally POLLAK, supra note 19, at 81-88 (describing effects on California cities and
counties).
161. See Richard Duane Faus, Exactions, Impact Fees, and Dedications-Local Government
Responses to Nollan/Dolan Takings Law Issues, 29 STETSON L. REV. 675, 677 (2000) (describing
property owners' negotiation stances after Dolan as changing from a "let's make a deal" approach to a
"let's make a claim" approach); Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, "Paying" for the
Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV.
1801, 1815 (1995) (noting the likelihood that Nollan's and Dolan's tests and burden shifting will
increase landowners' litigation threats). It perhaps goes without saying that threats to litigate can and do
result in lawsuits. See POLLAK, supra note 19, at 21-22 (describing the relationship between increases
in threats of litigation and increases in suits filed).
162. See POLLAK, supra note 19, at 16-18 (finding that more than half of the planners in counties
that responded to a survey reported a marked increase in the number of threats of litigation over the
past decade, and further reporting that such threats occur especially frequently when municipalities
consider discretionary approvals for intensification of land use, whether in the form of zoning changes,
subdivision approvals, conditional use permits, or variances).
163. See id. at 125-29.
164. See id at 23 (discussing the unavailability of takings insurance for municipalities in
California).
165. Property owners typically file suit under a statutory provision, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, that
allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees.
166. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (establishing the right of a property owner to compensation for "the period during
which the taking was effective").
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learned when a developer alleged a taking under Dolan arising from a road
dedication that the developer itself initially offered. 167 The county ulti-
mately prevailed in the litigation, in part because the developer had sug-
gested the dedication in the first place. Nevertheless, it did not receive full
compensation for its attorney's fees. 68 Threats to sue therefore undoubt-
edly affect land use decision making.
In light of the threat of litigation, many jurisdictions across California,
and presumably elsewhere, have established new but costly procedures for
calculating exactions. 169  Although Dolan did not require a precise
"mathematical calculation" to meet its rough proportionality test,17° courts
have required local governments to adopt and apply fairly rigorous stan-
dards with defensible, continually updated methodologies and estimates to
support the concessions they exact from property owners.' Such studies
are expensive, and their cost has only increased with the threat of height-
ened scrutiny.'72 High costs of compliance are typically passed on to devel-
opers, in requirements that they pay for environmental review of the
proposed development-costs that developers in turn are likely to pass on
to landowners or consumers.'73 Compliance with exactions rules is costly;
these costs delay development, are often passed on to developers (and, sub-
sequently, home buyers and tenants), and require additional legal and
administrative resources from local governments.
167. See KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 67 P.3d 56, 59 (Idaho 2003).
168. Id. at61, 63-64.
169. See POLLAK, supra note 19, at 125-29.
170. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395-96 (1994).
171. See, e.g., Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 686-87 (Minn. 1997) (striking
down impact fee system on the grounds that the system by which fees were assessed was not
periodically updated); F & W Assocs. v. County of Somerset, 648 A.2d 482, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1994) (upholding traffic impact fees based on a study that devised volume-capacity ratios,
measured the demand volume and existing road capacity, projected impacts from development based
on industry standards and empirical data, suggested roadway improvements to mitigate impacts, and
estimated costs of improvements).
172. See Recent Case, Home Builders Ass'n of Northern California v. City of Napa, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), 115 HARV. L. REV. 2058, 2061, 2061 n.33 (2002) (estimating current
cost of nexus studies sufficient to comply with Nollan and Dolan to be between $20,000 and $35,000);
Edward J. Sullivan, Dolan and Municipal Risk Assessment, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 1-2 (1997)
(discussing increased cost of compliance following Dolan).
173. See Ryan, supra note 60, at 366-67 (reporting that increased compliance costs in Tigard,
Oregon, following the Dolan decision, were passed along to developers); Clyde W. Forrest, Planned
Unit Development and Takings Post Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 571, 580-81 (1995) (noting that the
expense required for studies required to support exactions is often borne by developers). Like impact
fees, such costs may be borne by developers, or, depending upon a variety of market factors, passed
backward to landowners when developers pay lower prices for undeveloped land or forward to new
home purchasers through higher prices for new homes. See MARLA DRESCH & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN,
WHO PAYS FOR DEVELOPMENT FEES AND EXACTIONS? 25-26 (1997); Keith R. Ihlanfeldt & Timothy M.
Shaughnessy, An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Impact Fees on Housing and Land Markets
15-16 (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Working Paper No. CP02AI3, 2000), available at
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/pub-detail.asp?id=563.
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Even when local governments reviewed extensive engineering and
planning reports before imposing an exaction, courts have sometimes dis-
missed municipalities' findings of rough proportionality. 7 4 Indeed, Dolan
itself rejected a bicycle path exaction as constitutionally unacceptable, de-
spite the City of Tigard's mathematical calculation of the increased number
of car trips the proposed store expansion would create and a rough estimate
of the decreased traffic congestion that the completed bikepath would pro-
duce.'75 Good faith efforts to comply do not insure against actual or threat-
ened liability under the heightened scrutiny of exactions rules.
B. The Lure of Regulatory Formulas
As a result of the challenges and costs of complying with the Court's
exactions decisions, local governments have shifted toward imposing legis-
latively enacted impact fees rather than in-kind exactions requiring the
dedication of land.'76 Two doctrinal issues in Nollan and Dolan favor this
shift. First, under a narrow reading of those decisions' reach, certain meth-
ods of imposing impact fees are less likely to face heightened scrutiny than
are ad hoc, dedicatory exactions.'77 When derived as an impact fee ordi-
nance and then applied equally to all similarly situated property owners,
exactions formulas establish a legislative, rather than adjudicative, basis for
174. See, e.g., Art Piculell Group v. Clackamas County, 922 P.2d 1227 (Or. Ct. App. 1996)
(overturning and remanding to county conditions placed on subdivision approval, despite local
officials' findings that conditions had met rough proportionality standard); Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of
Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 391 (III. App. Dist. 1995) (ruling that municipality's requirement of a
dedication of land as a condition of issuance of a special use permit failed to meet the rough
proportionality test).
175. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395; cf Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash.
1994) (upholding parks and recreation impact fee under Dolan because county had provided a detailed,
individualized study of the need for more parkland).
176. Compare Carlson & Pollak, supra note 19, at 137-38 (noting that in recent years, following
Nollan and Dolan, California cities and counties have shifted toward applying legislated fees, rather
than individualized land dedications, in their exactions), with Elizabeth D. Purdum & James E. Frank,
Community Use of Exactions: Results of a National Survey, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 128, tbl.6-5
(James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 1987) (summarizing results of a 1985 study of exactions
practice in local governments finding that the exactions applied as part of the approval process were
predominantly flexible rather than based on set formulas), and MESHENBERG, supra note 51, at 48
(discussing an exactions process before Nollan and Dolan and noting that although subdivision
regulations may include formulas to calculate exactions, "negotiation is in reality an intimate part of the
subdivision approval process" as local governments and developers seek to trade entitlements for quick
and mutually beneficial approvals). See also Stephen P. Chinn et al., Dolan v. City of Tigard: Kansas
Local Governments Beware-The Supreme Court Further Restricts the Authority of Municipalities to
Condition Development Approval, J. KAN. BAR ASS'N, Nov. 1995, at 30, 37 (predicting a shift toward
impact fee ordinances and away from individualized, in-kind dedications in exactions practice). The
development of impact fees as a general approach predated Dolan, however. In states that applied a
deferential test to challenged exactions, jurisdictions have long favored fees to mitigate certain types of
impacts for which land dedication was inappropriate, or for projects on small land areas with no land to
dedicate. See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, The Legal Issues of Capital Facilities Funding, in PRIVATE
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES 51, 52-53 (Rachelle Alterman ed., 1988).
177. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
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imposing exactions, thereby arguably sidestepping the reach of the Takings
Clause.'78 Imposing legislative exactions also likely will avoid application
of nexus and proportionality tests when exactions are rejected or with-
drawn.179 Even better, when such fees are imposed under the authority of
state legislation, 80 they appear even more likely to be fairly derived and
imposed, insofar as statutes require nexus and proportionality findings 8'
and property owners in other jurisdictions within the state are subject to
similar fees. 8 2 Negotiated exactions appear perilous when compared to
these formulaic, legislated fees.' 83
Second, even if heightened scrutiny applies, formulaic exactions are
more likely to withstand the nexus and proportionality tests. Exactions de-
signed using widely accepted methodologies, such as those that calculate
the costs and mitigation of a new development's traffic and school impacts,
appear less vulnerable to claims of being disproportionate.' 84 Mathematical
formulas, whose scale responds directly to predictable and quantifiable
impacts captured in the dollar costs of harms and mitigation, likely are
more persuasive to courts that either lack expertise in land use planning or
are protective of property owners.' 85 Furthermore, because complex formu-
las can include individualized assessments of the impacts of a particular
178. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 146-51.
180. Almost half of the states have authorized impact fees. See MANDELKER, supra note 62,
§ 9.21.
181. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66001(a)(3), 66005(c) (West 2003) (requiring "reasonable
relationship between the fee's use and the type of development project on which the fee is imposed,"
and codifying "constitutional and decisional" law); TEX. Loc. GOV'T ANN. CODE §§ 395.001(4),
395.014(3) (Vernon 2002) (authorizing impact fees only if they fund capital improvements
"necessitated by and attributable to... new development").
182. The Texas impact fee statute itself establishes a maximum fee. See TEX. Loc. GOV'T ANN.
CODE § 395.015 (Vernon 2002).
183. Fred P. Bosselman, Dolan Works, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES 345, 350 (Thomas E.
Roberts ed., 2002) ("[l]f negotiation with the developer creates a risk of liability for the city that does
not exist if the city imposes a flat fee, the city lawyer is likely to discourage such negotiations.").
184. See WILLIAM FULTON, GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA PLANNING 227-300 (2d ed. 1999). See, e.g.,
CONNIE B. COOPER, TRANSPORTATION IMPACT FEES AND EXCISE TAXES: A SURVEY OF I6
JURISDICTIONS (2000) (surveying impact fees and road-financing methodologies); JAMES C. NICHOLAS,
THE CALCULATION OF PROPORTIONATE-SHARE IMPACT FEES 23-34 (1988) (reproducing calculations
used by various local governments to establish fee formulas to mitigate impacts of new development on
traffic, schools, parks, and libraries).
185. See COOPER, supra note 184, at 56 (reproducing the American Planning Association Policy
Guide on Impact Fees, which describes legislative efforts to formalize impact fee regimes as a response
to "substantial case law"); NICHOLAS ET AL., supra note 60, at 36 (stating that properly derived impact
fees are less likely to be affected by Supreme Court exactions cases because of "the preciseness and
sophistication with which economic analysis can be applied"); Carlson & Pollak, supra note 19, at 137-
38 (concluding, based on case studies, that local jurisdictions find fees easier to use to quantify and
scale exactions). They may also seem fairer to property owners. See POLLAK, supra note 19, at 87
(noting that more respondents to the survey identified challenges to individualized exactions than to
generally applicable fees).
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proposal, such formulas will appear more likely to calculate rough propor-
tionality.
18 6
Another reason to use formulas to determine impact fees and exac-
tions is that formulas, once developed, can be used repeatedly for land use
applications, thereby simplifying regulatory practices. Indeed, legislative
formulas applied mechanically can settle disputes wholesale, as opposed to
the more time-consuming and variable approach of designing individual-
ized exactions.'87 To attract development, progrowth communities have
made their formulas transparent to create a predictable and palatable pro-
ject approval regime.'88 Moreover, municipalities that establish formulas
based upon comprehensive, long-range plans are less likely to face takings
liability. Courts are likely to find such formulas persuasive insofar as they
appear to be part of an ordered, considered regulatory scheme rather than
an effort to obtain concessions from individual landowners.
89
For these reasons, exactions practice at the local level has become
more cautious and systematic and is focused on preformulated planning
decisions.' 9 Pushing local governments toward long-range, comprehensive
planning based on mathematical formulas is an ironic, though not unex-
pected, result of the Court's exactions cases.' 9' In its logic and effects-
testing for nexus and proportionality, which leads to mathematical, legisla-
tive formulas-the Supreme Court's formalist approach to the constitu-
tionality of exactions appears consistent with the conception of planning as
a discipline and practice. 92 Thus, in its effort to protect property owners by
curbing overregulation, a conservative majority of the Supreme Court has
endorsed the regulatory logic of planning, with its claims of modem scien-
tific and engineering expertise, as a necessary intervention into the private
186. See Roger K. Dahlstrom, Development Impact Fees: A Review of Contemporary Techniques
for Calculation, Data Collection, and Documentation, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 557, 558-59 (1995);
Nelson, supra note 57, at 554-55.
187. See Nelson, supra note 57, at 552-53; NICHOLAS ET AL., supra note 60, at 54. See generally
Kaplow, supra note 103, at 621 (discussing efficiency advantages of rules that regulate frequently
recurring conduct).
188. See Elizabeth A. Deakin, The Politics of Exactions, in PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES
96, 103 (Rachelle Alterman ed., 1988).
189. See NICHOLAS ET AL., supra note 60, at 37.
190. See POLLAK, supra note 19, at 8 1.
191. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (endorsing the "commendable task of
land use planning, made necessary by increasing urbanization").
192. See Dahlstrom, supra note 186, at 569 (stating that Nollan and Dolan confirm the value of
data collection and analysis in development impacts and the logic of impact fee programs); Stewart E.
Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731, 1743-44 (1988) (noting that a
tight linkage between the mitigation required in an exaction and a proposed new project secures a
measure of good planning and stability). This consistency with the logic of land use planning explains
why planners apparently approve of Nollan and Dolan in the abstract. See POLLAK, supra note 19, at 33
(study of local government planners in California showing majority endorsing Nollan and Dolan as
promoting "good land use planning practice").
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ordering of land use.'93 To place this irony within Bruce Ackerman's ter-
minology, the Court's efforts to provide an Ordinary Observer's concep-
tion of property-local governments should not extort major concessions
from owners seeking to develop their land-have resulted in the legal tests
and administrative rules of the Scientific Policymaker. '94
The Court implicitly assumes that rules will protect individual prop-
erty owners and, as a result, property rights generally. But the proper en-
forcement of those rules requires engineers and planners to develop and
constantly update complex formulas, a task that almost certainly will be
relegated to a formal bureaucracy. Ironically, bureaucracies by their nature
may be incapable of providing the property protections that the Court seeks
to enforce. As Max Weber noted, the formal rationality of bureaucratic or-
ganizations "unavoidably collide[s]" with efforts to provide substantive
justice that protects individuals.'95 The collision itself is unavoidable in the
modem administrative state, and it produces a range of consequences af-
fecting both the regulation of property owners and communities, and the
practices and legitimacy of local governance. These consequences are far
more complicated than the Court presumes. I begin to outline them in the
section that follows, which describes the collision of property rights and
variable local context, before considering them more fully in Parts IV and
V.
C. The Simplicity of Formalism and Formulas on the Complex Political
Economic Ground of Property
The narrative of the good and bad actors of local land use regula-
tion,'96 latent in all of the Court's exactions decisions, is unpersuasive on a
number of grounds. First, the Court ignored the extent to which parties ad-
versely affected by local government decisions and deferential state courts
have recourse to higher and competing legislative bodies. Affected prop-
erty owners and developers may, and often do, seek assistance from state
and federal legislatures for statutory protections against rent-seeking, ex-
ploitative behavior by majoritarian local governments.'97 Such assistance
may come in the general forms of state takings statutes that provide more
193. Of course, the Court's endorsement is ironic only insofar as planning as a discipline and
profession defines itself against visions of unregulated land use and strong private property rights. But
at least one critic of contemporary planning condemns the profession for functioning as little more than
the utilitarian facilitator of land commodification for development. See MICHAEL J. DEAR, THE
POSTMODERN URBAN CONDITION 124-26 (2000).
194. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10-15 (1977).
195. See MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER 220-21 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans.,
1946).
196. See supra Part II.C.
197. See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1138-39 (1996)
(reviewing FISCHEL, supra note 18). Of course, as Rose notes, higher levels of government are
themselves subject to the constraints and failures of coalition politics. See id.
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protection than federal constitutional guarantees do'98 and of more specifi-
cally targeted legislation that limits the authority, scope, and extent of the
exactions municipalities may impose.199
Second, the Court failed to recognize a core tenet of urban econom-
ics: that property owners vote with their feet, seeking friendlier land use
regulatory regimes in other jurisdictions when necessary.200 Indeed, many
jurisdictions across the country actively compete for particular develop-
ment projects, offering not merely to waive exactions and cede other regu-
latory authority but to provide incentives to attract certain types of
development.0 1 Relocating to such accommodating jurisdictions can be an
effective response to overregulation that frustrates financial, social, and
political expectations.20 2 Such movements free property owners from un-
friendly jurisdictions' policies and damage those jurisdictions' property
values and tax bases. 203 By portraying property owners as captives to local
exactions policy, the Court ignores the exit option available to many land-
holders °.2  Admittedly, commercial and industrial property owners and
property developers are better able to exit than are individual home owners,
who prefer a particular nonfungible household location and cannot afford
the transaction costs of exit, and property owners of all types with sunk
costs in location or nonmobile infrastructure.20 5 But the existence of vari-
able exit opportunities supports a contextualist, balancing approach to
198. See Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation,
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187 (1997); Carl P. Marcellino, Note, The Evolution of State Takings Legislation and
the Proposals Considered During the 1997-98 Legislative Session, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 143 (1998).
199. See MANDELKER, supra note 62, § 9.21.
200. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcON. 416 (1956)
(developing a hypothesis of consumer-voters sorting themselves based on preferences for a package of
taxes, services, and amenities). Of course, local governments can offer distinct public goods only to the
extent that they have the legal authority (to tax, spend, and regulate) and fiscal ability to do so. See
WILLIAM A. FIScHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001). Moreover, the Tiebout hypothesis can
explain the exit and entrance of only those individuals with the capacity and wealth to opt out of and
into communities; obviously, no one would choose to opt into poor local services. See Gerald E. Frug,
City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 28-34 (1998).
201. See Been, supra note 13, at 527-28 (relying upon empirical studies to demonstrate that
jurisdictions compete for residents by attempting to offer desirable, differentiated packages of public
services and taxes); Bosselman, supra note 183, at 350 ("In many cases, developers pay no exactions
whatsoever and receive contributions from the city for blessing it with a desirable project for which
other communities are competing.").
202. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 15-17 (1970). The effects of exit on
local tax bases vary. Although home owner exit affects a tax base only incrementally, because a
resident's exit is often predicated upon the sale of her home to a replacement taxpayer, the exit of a
large commercial entity or of a major residential developer is likely to have a more immediate impact
either by shrinking existing revenues or slowing the growth of future revenues. See RONALD J.
OAKERSON, GOVERNING LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES 110-11 (1999).
203. Rose, supra note 5 1, at 882-87.
204. See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism
from the Attack on "'Monarchism " to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74, 89-93 (1989).
205. See OAKERSON, supra note 202, at 109-11.
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takings claims rather than heightened judicial scrutiny that produces a for-
mulaic regulatory response.
Third, the Court assumed the political victimhood of a broad class of
potential takings plaintiffs despite differences in their intentions, political
leverage, wealth, and property. The developers that slow-growth jurisdic-
tions tend to fight (with either denials or stringent exaction requirements)
are often high-stakes players-those who are most capable of using their
financial resources or political voice to combat attempted coercion 21 6 and,
failing that, those who are best able to simply abandon the jurisdiction.
Large developers are not the only potential takings plaintiffs who have
strong sources of leverage at the municipal bargaining table: owners of
undeveloped property they are seeking to sell can, in many instances, both
constitute an interest group themselves and form political alliances with
developers.2 7 Politics are not static, and political victimhood is imperma-
nent, as recently proved in Loudoun County, Virginia. Prodevelopment
forces in this rural-suburban county outside of Washington, D.C., regained
a majority on the board of supervisors from environmentalists and "smart
growth" advocates and, according to one supervisor, established home-
builders as a "shadow board. 2
8
On the other hand, individual property owners needing discretionary
approval for specific and singular changes to their existing land use are less
able to gain the political leverage necessary to counteract a local govern-
ment's efforts to exact extortionate concessions. 29 The Court intervened in
its exactions decisions precisely on behalf of individual plaintiffs who
owned relatively modest amounts of property, who were unable to find
similar property elsewhere, and who seemed especially vulnerable to
206. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS 120 (2001). See also Deakin, supra note 188, at 106
(noting close ties between the real estate development industry and elected officials in local
communities). For example, a small number of property owners and developers can capture the local
govemment decision-making power, successfully organize their intense interest in gaining lucrative
development approvals over the dispersed interests of the majority of existing residents, and persuade
their state legislature to pass statutes that are favorable to development and remove the authority of
local governments. See Dana, supra note 18, at 1271-74. Carol Rose has characterized as "localism
bashing" the pessimistic conception of local government regulators as thoughtless objects of
majoritarian influence. See Rose, supra note 197, at 1131-32.
207. See Rose, supra note 197, at 1135-36.
208. Michael Laris & Rosalind S. Helderman, Five New Players May Chart New Course for
Board, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2003, at TI. In the same election cycle, another Washington suburb,
Prince William County, Virginia, swung in the other direction, toward slower growth. See Steven
Ginsberg, A Slow-Growth Path for Pr. William; Voters Change Direction on Development, Expansion
of SherifJ's Duties, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2003, at B5.
209. Prior to Nollan and Dolan, state courts did distinguish between large-scale development
interests and vulnerable small property owners. In one instance, a court declared that a more rigorous
standard of review of exactions was appropriate for challenges by individual property owners, on the
assumption both that the approval sought by a subdivider would have more impact on the community
and that the subdivider would be less vulnerable to majoritarian exploitation. See Wald Corp. v. Metro.
Dade County, 338 So.2d 863, 864, 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
[Vol. 92:609
2004] TAKINGS FORMALISM AND REGULATORY FORMULAS 651
political majorities. 2" But the decisions' formalist conception of property
ownership as a single category for purposes of takings jurisprudence pro-
vides more leverage to the large-scale developers and landowners who
need the Court's protections least. Repeat-playing and powerful landown-
ers and developers can protect themselves politically through influence and
contributions to candidates. They can also deploy their Fifth Amendment
protections through capable legal counsel, diversify their investments and
projects by purchasing or developing land in different jurisdictions, and
exercise their exit option by abandoning an unfriendly jurisdiction. Indeed,
even individual small landholders at some times in some jurisdictions have
sufficient political voice and leverage to protect themselves without judi-
cial intervention.21'
In situations in which jurisdictions compete for development and
property owners may exit with relative ease or successfully engage in po-
litical lobbying, the Court's story of powerful, unchecked local govern-
ments is inaccurate and unpersuasive. The heightened judicial scrutiny of
nexus and proportionality, therefore, is not only unnecessary but also intru-
sive and overly protective of wealthy, powerful interests.1 2 Nevertheless,
some localities offer such attractive natural or geographical amenities that
their local governments may ignore their competition and may not care-or
indeed may hope-that new entrants will be scared away by a rigorous
regulatory regime.213 Vested developers and property owners in such un-
friendly jurisdictions are stranded without an easy exit option.2 4 The dy-
namics of local governance and property ownership may thereby render
these individual plaintiffs especially vulnerable to the vicissitudes of ma-
joritarian political sentiment and administrative overreaching.215
Accordingly, judicial scrutiny is more needed in some contexts and unnec-
essarily intrusive and disruptive in others.
But the Court's approach belies such variability and complexity. It
ignores what Margaret Radin has called the "recalcitrant practice" of prop-
erty--"the stubborn situatedness of people and their property, and the
210. Many of the Court's takings decisions expanding property rights protections were litigated by
the Pacific Legal Foundation, which represented the Nollans and Dolans before the Supreme Court. See
generally Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and
Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 539-42 (1998) (chronicling and
criticizing the role of conservative legal advocacy groups in finding sympathetic plaintiffs and litigating
takings cases).
211. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land Use
Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 485-86 (2000).
212. See Smith, supra note 57, at 30.
213. SeeDana, supranote 18, at 1271 n.129.
214. See EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 184-85.
215. See FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 4-5, 9 (arguing that exit is more available at the state or
federal level than at the local level); but see Rose, supra note 197, at 1134-35 (arguing that exit is at
least equally available at the local, state, and federal levels).
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endless variations in property relations. '"216 The factual scenarios in Nollan
and Dolan, in contrast to the majority of discretionary approvals, enable a
narrative of land use regulation that pits omnipotent government agencies
against besieged property owners. The Court tells this story from an indi-
vidual rights-based perspective with a utilitarian flavor that ignores issues
of progressivity,1 7 sustainability, environmental aesthetics, and social and
environmental justice.2t The Court assumes that only a sufficiently robust
constitutional regime can limit the regulatory tendencies of overreaching
local governments. As a result, the Court's solution to this narrative is a
powerful doctrinal shield for the victims of extortionate regulatory arm-
twisting whose protections extend to those with no need for them. The
Court's simplistic assumption and formalist solution result in a series of
unfortunate regulatory results. Those results are the focus of the remainder
of this Article.
IV
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXACTIONS DECISIONS
As formal concepts, nexus and proportionality should lead to land use
regulations that protect property owners' expectations of the broad extent
of their property rights while nevertheless requiring the full internalization
of all external costs produced by a proposed new land use.219 However,
given the variable political, economic, and environmental contexts of local
land use regulation, the Court's exactions doctrine is unlikely to achieve its
apparent purposes of protecting robust property rights and restraining mu-
nicipalities' tendencies to overregulate. Local governments respond differ-
ently to the Court's commands, because they work under varied state laws
within varied economic and political contexts, face diverse housing mar-
kets, and protect unique environmental resources and local amenities.2
216. Radin, supra note 23, at 265.
217. See Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 781-90 (1999)
(offering a progressive, egalitarian conception of takings that considers the socioeconomic status of the
affected landowner).
218. See generally Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 63, 83-88 (2003) (listing and detailing various ethical impulses developed in the field of
environmental ethics).
219. That is, if we assume that local government will seek to internalize all present and future
costs that are known and unknown, and if we further assume that such costs could pass the nexus and
rough proportionality tests, then Nollan and Dolan could produce an ideal cost internalization akin to
the assumptions of the common law trespass and nuisance doctrines. See Robert H. Cutting, "One
Man's Ceilin' Is Another Man's Floor": Property Rights as the Double-Edged Sword, 31 ENVTL. L.
819 (2001) (attempting to utilize common law doctrines to require full internalization of externalities).
220. See generally MICHAEL A. PAGANO & ANN O'M. BOWMAN, CITYSCAPES AND CAPITAL 2-4
(1995) (arguing that in matters of land use and urban development, politics and political leadership
matter and operate within local historical, social, economic, and structural contexts); David L. Callies,
The Quiet Revolution Redux: How Selected Local Governments Have Fared, 20 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 277, 279-90 (2002) (summarizing distinct efforts of the city and county of Honolulu, the Portland
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And yet the exactions decisions are descriptively and prescriptively simple
and ultimately fail to recognize and respond to this complexity of local
governance and land use. Takings rules impose external formality on local
regulatory decision making, requiring local governments to demonstrate
nexus and proportionality when those metrics are difficult to find, prove,
and negotiate. In some instances, such formality will work as intended; in
others, it will not.
Consequences matter in evaluating the Court's exactions decisions
because the exactions rules are themselves consequentialist. The terms
"essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" appear nowhere in the text of
the Fifth Amendment. They are modern tests developed by the Supreme
Court to police land use regulation.2"' In adopting these tests, the Court
relied both upon incorrect assumptions about the parties and processes of
local land use regulation and upon similarly incorrect assumptions about
the practicality, applicability, and legitimacy of its externally derived for-
mal rules in the context of local land use regulation. The Court's imposi-
tion of strict takings rules in the context of exactions does not provide a
mechanical, universal means to protect property rights judicially and en-
sure efficient regulation; rather, it produces varied responses, many of them
unintended by the Court and perverse or ironic in effect. The exactions
rules do not produce the expected consequences that form the basis and
purpose of the rules themselves. Articulating a series of formal tests in an
effort to curb unjust rent seeking both expresses a normative commitment
and seeks to further a utilitarian end. As such, it is an effort to extend the
bare text of the Takings Clause to check what the Court perceives to be
unwise policy decisions that, in some instances, produce constitutionally
unjust results. Assessing the consequences of the Court's effort is, there-
fore, a means by which to evaluate the Court's conception and protection
of constitutional property rights.
No single vision of property and takings law can suffice to produce
sufficiently flexible, contextualized responses to the regulatory needs and
political and social circumstances of land use disputes.222 This inherent
region, and the state of Florida to impose growth management controls); Durchslag, supra note 211, at
488 (noting that, within any particular local community, "[w]hether exit is possible and voice exists are
empirical questions").
221. See supra text accompanying notes 62-68 (describing tests developed by state courts prior to
Nollan and Dolan); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1994) (explaining derivation of
proportionality test); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (explaining derivation
of and reasoning behind nexus test).
222. See Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CAN. J. L. & JURIS.
161, 193 (1996); cf Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393, 1401
(1991) (noting the impossibility of finding a unified theory of takings because "there are simply too
many compelling and conflicting theories for any to account accurately for American attitudes toward
the takings dilemma"); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 280 (1998)
(describing diverse rhetorical visions of property).
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variability not only makes the Court's efforts appear simplistic or duplici-
tous in their assumption of a singular narrative of exploitation, but it also
cannot help but undermine the Court's formal approach. 23 The unruly con-
text of land use regulation and local politics ultimately leads to widespread,
incremental departures from the Court's formal commands or, where juris-
dictions obey the Court, to consequences that are frustrating and disruptive
to local governance. In the preceding Part, I described in detail the variabil-
ity of local land use practice and explained how such variability conflicts
with the Court's takings formalism and its resulting regulatory formulas. In
this Part, I consider more fully a series of predictable adverse consequences
of formalism and formulas: more underregulation, when jurisdictions at-
tempt to comply with the nexus and proportionality tests and require insuf-
ficient exactions; more regulation or fewer entitlements for property
owners and developers, when jurisdictions deny development proposals
with significant externalities to avoid the risk of constitutional liability for
applying an exaction; and no effect, when jurisdictions simply disobey the
commands and continue to require unconstitutional concessions. Ironically,
as local governments step further back from engaging in case-specific con-
sideration of a development's impacts, or selectively ignore the Court's
commands, the exactions decisions result in the opposite of the constitu-
tional regime of property protection and more efficient regulation the Court
sought to impose. Even local governments that attempt to comply with the
Court's constitutional commands by engaging in costly efforts to identify
and seek compensation for the anticipated harms of a new development
may face resistance by recalcitrant, litigious property owners and a skepti-
cal empowered judiciary that views most regulatory efforts as takings.
A. Consequence 1: Underregulation Due to Insufficient Exactions
When local governments-fearful of compliance and litigation costs,
the risk of judicial review under Nollan and Dolan, and the costs of takings
liability-either fail to impose an exaction or impose a less stringent exac-
tion than necessary to capture the costs of the development, the exactions
cases result in underregulation224 that effects "givings" to property
223. In addition, imposing a rigorous federal constitutional regime on this area of law runs counter
to federalist principles of preferring state and local control and of enabling widespread experimentation
by state legislatures. See Durchslag, supra note 211, at 491-92; Michelman, supra note 43, at 327.
224. By "underregulation" I mean that the regulating agency-typically a municipality, in the land
use context-fails to force the property owner to internalize all costs associated with all negative
impacts of a proposed development. Oddly, few commentators have considered in depth the extent to
which Nollan and Dolan are likely to lead to underregulation. See, e.g., Been, supra note 13, at 505-06
(leaving discussion of underregulation "for another day" because the Supreme Court's focus has been
on developers, not the public, and because underregulation is an issue arising from the development
approvals themselves rather than from the exactions that are imposed as part of the approvals); Fennell,
supra note 18, at 40-41 (considering only briefly underregulatory effects, while emphasizing that nexus
and proportionality might actually aid efforts to impose controls that would overregulate).
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owners.225 Indeed, some jurisdictions have responded to the exactions deci-
sions by seeking smaller concessions from property owners. For instance,
nearly one-half of California counties and more than one-quarter of
California cities reduced impact fees and exactions relating to roads and
traffic-related infrastructure, open space, trails, and public access to natural
resources during the discretionary approval process in the years following
Dolan.26 Reduced exactions are at least in part a response to the vertical
and horizontal limits to exactions bargaining that the nexus and propor-
tionality tests establish. 227 The victimized property owner has a constitu-
tional cause of action when an exaction requires quantitatively more than
Dolan's vertical limit of rough proportionality or qualitatively runs beyond
Nollan's horizontal limit of conditions with an essential nexus to the pro-
ject's harms. No such formal protection-whether in the form of a consti-
tutional right to challenge an insufficient exaction or of a floor that would
correspond with Nollan's and Dolan's constitutional ceiling-exists for
those who must pay the costs or suffer the consequences of an exaction that
requires too little of the property owner.228 Thus, in imposing an exaction, a
municipality faces pressure on one side from the intense interests of a
225. See Davidson et al., supra note 159, at 697 (characterizing "chilling effect" on municipalities'
assertive exactions, leading to "increased capitulation, or perhaps to a negotiated development that is
more compromising than that initially proposed by planning staff," as a possible result of Nollan and
Dolan). "Givings" refers to the converse of "takings"-instances in which a government promulgates a
regulation that grants benefits to, rather than confiscates the property of, an identifiable individual or
individuals. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, Ill YALE L.J. 547 (2001); Eric
Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489 (1999). Givings in the exactions context occur when a local
government grants a development approval but fails to require sufficient offsets for the development's
costs, thereby diminishing the value or enjoyment of others' property, draining the public fisc, and
degrading environmental resources. The local government has thereby granted a giving to the
developing property owner and imposed, at least indirectly, a taking on others. See Bell &
Parchomovsky, supra, at 610.
226. POLLAK, supra note 19, at 23-25. Anecdotal reports confirm increased anxiety among
planners and local government officials regarding the imposition of stringent exactions and a relaxing
of bargaining demands. See Ryan, supra note 60, at 350 n.71.
227. Determining proper levels of regulation is challenging. So, although California's response to
Dolan may represent systematic underregulation, it could also signify in some instances a reduction in
exactions and impact fees that previously were exploitative to more fair and efficient levels.
228. Some commentators assert, without explanation, that Nollan and Dolan provide a third-party
right to challenge regulations that fail to meet the nexus and proportionality tests. See FISCHEL, supra
note 18, at 349-50; Fennell, supra note 18, at 40-41. Nothing in either decision indicates the Court's
intent to create such a right; if anything, the Court's narrow focus on the rights of landowners seeking
regulatory approvals demonstrates its clear lack of interest in the rights of other affected parties. It is
the expropriation of the property owner's land, not effects on anyone else's land, that leads the Court to
apply the Takings Clause in Nollan and Dolan. That said, state law may provide third parties with a
cause of action for a judicial challenge of a local government's final land use decision. See, e.g.,
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1926) (authorizing appeals
from decisions of board of adjustment by "persons... aggrieved"); Butters v. Hauser, 960 P.2d 181
(Idaho 1998) (finding that neighboring landowner had standing to challenge ordinance and issuance of
discretionary permit authorizing radio transmission tower that, she alleged, was in close proximity to
her land and affected use of her electronic equipment). See generally MANDELKER, supra note 62,
§§ 8.02, 8.04 (discussing third-party standing to challenge land use decisions in state court).
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potential litigant with powerful legal rights who may also be able to muster
a political interest group of property owners, and, from the other side, the
more diffuse interests of a potential political interest group united around
opposition to a specific proposal or to certain types of development gener-
ally. This balance may vary by community, but in progrowth or litigation
risk-averse jurisdictions, the heightened scrutiny of nexus and proportion-
ality provides a powerful weapon for property owners that third parties
lack-a dynamic that could facilitate reduced regulation and community
absorption of unmitigated impacts.
Even assuming that in the wake of the exactions decisions local gov-
ernments attempt to exact the strongest concessions from property owners,
the logic and metrics of nexus and proportionality and the record required
to demonstrate constitutional compliance encourage underregulation.
Quantitative showings of proportionality and formulas are imperfect tools
for mitigating the impacts of new development because many impacts are
difficult to forecast and quantify with precision.229 Some impacts and miti-
gation programs, such as those that study the effects of new development
on traffic and forecast the road improvements necessary to address those
effects, are readily and repeatedly studied, anticipated, and quantified.230
But methodologies that identify and measure impacts on recreational,
transportation, and flood management infrastructure and that help formu-
late mitigation measures for those impacts are less precise and reliable,
increasing their vulnerability to heightened scrutiny.23' Yet this vulnerabil-
ity may in no way reflect the absence of long-term costs and externalities.
Impacts to wetlands, for instance, may be exceptionally difficult and ex-
pensive to mitigate-therefore failing to pass muster under Dolan-even
though wetland developments impose well-documented, costly
229. LAURENCE J. MEISNER & LAURA FIRTEL, PRIVATE FUNDING FOR ROADS 5 (1990); see also
Dahlstrom, supra note 186, at 564.
230. See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 19, at 134-36.
231. See id; Dana, supra note 18, at 1268; Robert H. Freilich & Terry D. Morgan, Municipal
Strategies for Imposing Valid Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan, in EXACTIONS, IMPACT
FEES AND DEDICATIONS 21, 29 (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995); Nick Rosenberg,
Comment, Development Impact Fees: Is Limited Cost Internalization Actually Smart Growth?, 30
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 641, 646-48 (2003); Danaya C. Wright, Eminent Domain, Exactions, and
Railbanking: Can Recreational Trails Survive the Court's Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence?,
26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 399, 431 (2001); Starritt & McClanahan, supra note 82, at 444-48
(demonstrating the difficulty of meeting Dolan through the pre-Dolan practice in Jackson, Wyoming,
of requiring new subdivisions along Flat Creek to donate a ten-foot public fishing easement along the
stream bank for environmental and public recreational purposes). Planners and local govemments have
nevertheless attempted to develop analyses for impacts that are more difficult to quantify, such as the
impacts of new development on parks and recreational facilities. See, e.g., Trimen Dev. Co. v. King
County, 877 P.2d 187, 189, 194 (Wash. 1994) (upholding imposition of a park impact fee imposed in
lieu of land dedication, authorized by state statute, where the county calculated the number of dedicated
acres of recreational parkland per new entrant into the community based on current needs and
established a fee based on the cost of the dedicated land); NICHOLAS ET AL., supra note 60, at 188-94
(offering model park impact fee ordinance).
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consequences for local ecologies and flood prevention over the long
term.232 And effects that have been studied and modeled extensively, such
as impacts on traffic, may be better addressed through mitigation programs
that lack a clear nexus, such as contributions to mass transit programs and
other alternative transportation programs. 233 Such mitigation programs of-
ten are not explicitly or entirely tied to the proposed development yet cor-
relate proportionately to the development's impacts. Nevertheless,
jurisdictions face a difficult hurdle in proving nexus and quantifying pro-
portionality between the mitigation program's benefits and the new devel-
opment's harms.234
Consider as well local government efforts to address affordable hous-
ing shortages through inclusionary zoning conditions for residential hous-
ing projects. Typical inclusionary zoning ordinances require developers to
include some percentage of affordable units in their residential projects;
some ordinances allow developers to avoid this requirement by paying fees
into a general fund used to increase public provision of affordable units.235
An intermediate appellate court in California decided that a local govern-
ment's general legislative enactment of an inclusionary zoning ordinance
applying to all residential projects is not subject to nexus and proportional-
ity requirements.236 If the exactions rules did apply to such programs, how-
ever, jurisdictions would have to make difficult, individualized
demonstrations of the connection between the proposed project and an in-
crease in the affordable housing shortage, and demonstrate proportionality
with the percentage of affordable units or fees required. Demonstrating
nexus and proportionality would not be impossible insofar as each new unit
of market-priced housing in an expensive region boosts the need for ser-
vice workers who cannot afford to pay market prices in such an area.
3 7
Nevertheless, a burden of showing nexus and proportionality would raise
the costs and risks for local governments that rely on inclusionary zoning
as a tool for addressing affordable housing crises.
Some, or even many, local governments may not even attempt to re-
quire mitigation of all impacts from development. Local land use mitiga-
tion typically focuses on direct anthropocentric impacts that have political
232. See Dana, supra note 18, at 1284.
233. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395 (1994) (holding that bike path easement
effected a taking because findings demonstrated only that the path could, rather than would or would be
likely to, offset an increase in traffic resulting from the hardware store expansion).
234. See Rosenberg, supra note 231, at 683-86 (summarizing trends in the judicial review of
impact fees intended to mitigate nonexclusive and indirect costs of development).
235. See Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully
Creating Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 973-74 (2002).
236. See Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 65-66 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001).
237. See Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at Its
Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539, 602 n.330 (1995).
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salience among voters, such as traffic, schools, and recreational facilities."8
It tends to ignore or insufficiently consider the indirect costs of develop-
ment, such as the economic and health costs of air pollution.23 9 Nollan and
Dolan, and the formulas toward which they are biased, limit local govern-
ments that seek to find alternative means to address existing infrastructure
deficits. For example, quantitative methodologies may insufficiently prove
the nexus and proportionality of commuter buses and bicycle paths as
means to mitigate the cumulative transportation impacts of new develop-
ment, thereby systematically favoring roads over alternative transporta-
tion.240 Except where required by federal and state environmental law,24'
some local governments discount potential environmental impacts, espe-
cially those that will spill over into other communities and those that in-
crementally but cumulatively cause significant impacts.242  Local
governments often lack the political will to consider, identify, and require
mitigation of such impacts, especially in the costly manner required by the
nexus and proportionality tests.243 This tendency to underregulate comes at
a time when local governments' role in environmental oversight has ex-
panded to include not only incidental controls through traditional land use
planning but also programs such as aquifer and wetlands protection, com-
prehensive environmental impact review, fish and wildlife habitat protec-
tion, stormwater management, and timber harvesting.24 4
Consider, too, the dynamic between judicial review and legislative
prerogative created by the heightened scrutiny of the exactions decisions.
Determining the "roughly proportional" width of an emergency access road
or an impact fee for the provision of fire service is an exceptionally
238. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 82.02.090(7) (2003) (limiting state authority to impose impact
fees for road building, schools, parks, open space, recreation areas, and fire stations).
239. See Vicki Been, Smart Growth Requires Efficient Growth, 34 CONN. L. REV. 611, 614
(2002).
240. See generally Dana, supra note 18, at 1278-80 (explaining that commuter bus mitigation for
new development likely would not meet heightened scrutiny).
241. The plethora of relevant federal environmental statutes, and the complicated relationships
among federal and state environmental laws and local land use and environmental laws, are beyond the
scope of this Article. See Nancy Perkins Spyke, The Land Use-Environmental Law Distinction: A Geo-
Feminist Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 55 (2002); Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the
"Impenetrable Jungle": Navigating the Boundary Between Land-Use Planning and Environmental
Law, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5 (1996).
242. See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 593-94 (1997) (noting the tendency of
regulators to fail to disaggregate incremental but cumulatively significant impacts); Reynolds, supra
note 139, at 566-69 (explaining the importance of considering cumulative impacts to which a single
project may contribute in land use decisions).
243. See Kathryn C. Plunkett, Comment, Local Environmental Impact Review: Integrating Land
Use and Environmental Planning Through Local Environmental Impact Reviews, 20 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 211, 212 (2002) (noting that the vast majority of states do not require local governments to
engage in formal environmental review of local development projects).
244. See John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 386-410 (2002).
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difficult endeavor, especially when the issue before the local government is
whether to require an access road at all. 245 When a property owner's miti-
gation of impacts would be disproportionately burdensome-when, for
example, construction of an emergency access road is exorbitantly expen-
sive-local governments and residents may be unable to force mitigation
without paying compensation.246 For instance, in reviewing an exaction,
one court held that where an emergency access road in an undeveloped
area would have remained unfinished until the surrounding parcels were
developed, a local government could not pass the nexus and proportionality
tests without proving to the court's satisfaction that the emergency road
would be completed in the "foreseeable future. 2 47 On those grounds, the
court ultimately overruled the local government regarding the construction
of the access road, and the property owner was able to subdivide his land
without dedicating a road suitable for emergency services. 248 In this re-
spect, the proportionality test invites courts to perform a rough cost-benefit
analysis to consider whether a costly concession for mitigation is somehow
proportional to the benefit it would provide. 249 Given the exactions deci-
sions' heightened scrutiny and bias in favor of protecting property rights,
the cost-benefit analysis courts undertake is unlikely to encompass the full
extent either of a development's long-term impacts or of a local govern-
ment's considerations when imposing exactions.25°
Nollan's and Dolan's formal logic is also likely to lead local govern-
ments to make conceptual errors that cause underregulation. As a general
matter, most regulatory practices deeply discount the occurrence and cost
of future harms, assuming regulators need to consider and mitigate only
presently discernible impacts.2 1' Fixed regulatory formulas exacerbate this
problem, leading regulators to underestimate the dynamic nature of
245. See Faus, supra note 161, at 688.
246. Dana, supra note 18, at 1284.
247. Burton v. Clark County, 958 P.2d 343, 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
248. After the county won the property owner's administrative appeal of the imposition of the
exaction, a trial court reversed and remanded the decision to the county on the grounds that the county
had "failed to make an individualized determination that [the exacted road] related both in nature and
extent to the impacts from the proposed development, as required to demonstrate 'rough
proportionality' under the holding in Dolan." Id. at 349. The county examiner, reconsidering the
property owner's appeal on remand, found that the county failed to meet Dolan's test and approved the
property owner's subdivision plan without the exacted road. See id. The intermediate state appellate
court affirmed the county examiner's decision. Id. at 358.
249. Arguably, cost-benefit analysis generally should be a legislative rather than a judicial
prerogative. Cf Driesen, supra note 242, at 610-12 (arguing that weighing costs and benefits is a
normative, political activity and therefore a task for legislatures rather than administrative agencies).
250. Cf Victor B. Flatt, Saving the Lost Sheep: Bringing Environmental Values Back into the
Fold with a New EPA Decisionmaking Paradigm, 74 WASH. L. REV. I, 4-5 (1999) (criticizing cost-
benefit analysis for its failure to consider the full range of issues and values implicated in
environmental decisions).
251. See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025, 2027-
28(1999).
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property across time and the relative uniqueness of any particular piece of
land with respect to its geographic location, environmental resources, and
relationship to its surroundings. 2 A regulatory approach that works once,
by imposing exactions on a particular land use, may not work later when
existing and newly approved activities cause more depletion to common
resources than initially estimated. Because of judicial skepticism and gov-
ernmental fear of retroactively adjusting a formula or making new formulas
more rigorous, the supply and quality of common resources-and, there-
fore, of all property within the jurisdiction-may diminish over time.253
Flexible, timely responses to changing resource conditions are essential
political decisions for governments to make. The role of takings jurispru-
dence is to protect the individual from exceptional unfairness as a result of
the transition to a new land use regime,254 not to prevent such decisions
from being made in the first place. A constitutional logic leading to regula-
tory formulas that cannot adapt to local, regional, and national environ-
mental changes ultimately provides greater individual property rights than
the Constitution requires, and as a result adversely affects political, social,
and environmental values made vulnerable to the entitlements these formu-
las create.255
But even if the exactions decisions lead to successful mitigation and
cost internalization of developments' off-site impacts on common pool re-
sources and public goods (such as traffic and schools), takings formalism
would still result in flawed and incomplete land use regulation. Impacts
whose external costs are difficult to quantify or mitigate-such as the
Nollans' new beach house-cannot be addressed with permissible condi-
tions, and mitigation measures that might be more politically popular and
more effective-such as the City of Tigard's bike paths-cannot pass con-
stitutional muster. In addition, new development may not be sustainable
over the long run on the land for which it is proposed. Owners seeking to
intensify the use of their land may have incomplete information about their
own long-term land use or may simply not care about the sustainability of
252. See Reynolds, supra note 139, at 563-66 (noting the unpredictability of negative land use
impacts due to the likelihood of varied site- and project-specific characteristics); Wegner, supra note
62, at 960 (noting the benefits of land use dealing as enabling individually crafted solutions to the
specific characteristics and problems of a proposed site on a particular parcel).
253. See Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law,
2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 18. Rose considers the possibility of "zipping back" property rights across the
board by imposing the more rigorous current regime on existing structures and land uses but dismisses
the idea both because of the economic consequences of tearing down or retrofitting existing structures
and the likely demoralizing effects on a wider populace. Id. at 19.
254. See Rose, supra note 197, at 1151.
255. See Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097,
1113 (1981) (arguing that rather than protecting against the loss of property rights, the Constitution
protects political rights in property, or "exposure to sudden changes in the major elements and crucial
determinants of one's established position in the world, as one has come ... to understand that
position" (internal quotations omitted)).
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their land under its proposed use. 6 Although the exactions decisions allow
local governments to require on-site mitigation, the risk of underregulation
is high because local governments prefer to avoid or safely meet the nexus
and proportionality tests and local governments and the public are more
concerned with off-site externalities than with long-term on-site impacts.
The exactions decisions' emphasis on property owners' right to ex-
clude257 also produces in some instances what Michael Heller has called an
"anticommons," in which too many exclusionary property rights so frag-
ment access to a valuable resource that they prevent the public from utiliz-
ing the resource at all." 8 Some conditions for development are efforts to
address the impacts of development by considering and seeking to mitigate
the external costs of strong property entitlements that would otherwise lead
to the public's overexclusion from an important local resource. 9
Considered in this way, the California Coastal Commission's requirement
that the Nollans cede a lateral beach easement sought to prevent an anti-
commons problem that could arise from the Nollans' ability to exclude the
public from walking across their private beach to enjoy nearby public
beaches and public trust lands. The Court's conclusion that the exaction
effected a taking recognized an overbroad right-the Nollans' absolute,
constitutionally protected right to exclude the public from a particularly
inviting part of their property-that prevented the coastal commission from
trading a desirable, discretionary entitlement held by the public to achieve
an optimal social level of beach use.26 °
By their nature, some impacts and mitigation programs do not lend
themselves to the logic and metrics of nexus and proportionality. If a local
government cannot, or lacks confidence in its ability to, prepare a record
sufficient to withstand the heightened scrutiny of the exactions cases, then
a new land use will inevitably effect some degree of a giving to the prop-
erty owner and pass along some of the costs of development to others.
B. Consequence 2: Overregulation Due to Denials Without Exactions
or Approvals with Inflexible Exactions
By contrast, in jurisdictions with the political will to deny a proposal
for development rather than approve a project with conditions that fail to
256. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, JUSTICE AND THE EARTH 26-42 (1993); Eric T. Freyfogle, The
Tragedy of Fragmentation, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 307, 329 (2002).
257. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987).
258. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622-25 (1998).
259. See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828 (describing exaction intended to allow beach access);
Starritt & McClanahan, supra note 82, at 445 (describing exactions intended to allow a public fishing
easement along a stream bank).
260. See Heller, supra note 42, at 1209-10.
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either internalize all costs or persuade local government officials, the exac-
tions decisions will result in overregulation of land uses. Local govern-
ments incur significant risks, including an increased risk of litigation, by
bargaining with property owners over discretionary approvals. To avoid
such risks, they can deny proposals that will be politically unpopular or
costly to the community rather than impose necessary exactions that might
be vulnerable to constitutional challenge.26' So long as a denial leaves the
subject property with sufficient value and uses, and does not frustrate the
owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, courts will apply the
Penn Central balancing test rather than the more searching nexus and pro-
portionality tests. 62 Even when a developer or property owner would will-
ingly choose an expensive condition over an outright denial, the burdens
and risks imposed by the nexus and proportionality tests can keep local
governments from offering such conditions. 63
Formulaic exactions adopted in response to the exactions cases can
also lead to more regulation. Unlike flexible bargains made with amenable
governments, rigid, legislatively enacted formulas can be difficult for de-
velopers and property owners to change, even in the face of weakening
markets." 4 In particular, developers operating in antigrowth jurisdictions
may prefer negotiated exactions over inflexible, generally applicable exac-
tion schemes that, by avoiding heightened scrutiny as legislative enact-
ments, may prove to be overinclusive and expensive. 65 To the extent that
the exactions decisions diminish local governments' willingness to bargain,
they restrict property owners' ability to negotiate to a mutually agreeable
position, thereby leaving property owners in a worse position than under a
bargain for a more expansive use. 66
261. The Court in Nollan explicitly assumed that the coastal commission could have denied the
plaintiffs' application for a building permit. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836. At oral argument in Dolan,
the plaintiffs conceded that the city could have denied their building permit, which Justice Stevens
confirmed in his dissent. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *4, Dolan (No. 93-518), available at 1994
WL 664939 (Mar. 23, 1994); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 397 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978).
263. This irony has led one commentator to condemn Nollan and Dolan for creating "the worst of
both worlds" insofar as they leave untouched local governments' broad authority under their police
powers to deny development proposals while tightening restrictions on bargaining around or away that
authority. See Fennell, supra note 18, at 4-5.
264. ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-IBAIEZ, supra note 55, at 56.
265. See Dana, supra note 18, at 1293.
266. See FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 348-49; KOMESAR, supra note 206, at Il l; Jerold S. Kayden,
Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan
Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 48 (1991). As Lee Anne Fennell notes, the Court has
thereby unwittingly taken a stick out of property owners' bundle of rights. See Fennell, supra note 18,
at 50. Moreover, property owners could claim that in some instances the Court's nuisance abatement
approach fails to take into account the benefits that a proposed project can bring to the community. To
take these benefits into account, the Court instead could have utilized a cost-benefit analysis that would
require the government to offset the development's community benefits against the exaction. (Of
course, local governments might then claim that they should be able to offset the value of an approval
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Governments are less likely to grant entitlements when mitigation of
the impacts on an especially sensitive resource is expensive. Consider, for
example, an impact that is particularly noticeable to the public and difficult
or impossible to mitigate, such as shade thrown by a tall office building
onto a public park or the development of especially beautiful open space
near a well-traveled public street. The local government might be reluctant
to require (because a property owner may be unwilling to pay) the cost of
full mitigation or may be unable to identify any feasible form of mitigation
and is therefore more likely to deny the development proposal than ap-
prove it, knowing the impacts will go unmitigated. 67 Where a proposed
project is politically unpopular and mitigation of its negative impacts is
insufficient to persuade the political majority, the property owner's offer of
an unrelated but attractive and roughly proportional amenity may bring
about an approval.168 However, a local government that requires or accepts
an amenity that lacks an essential nexus runs the risk of a property owner's
challenge under Nollan. Finally, jurisdictions that have failed to force ade-
quate internalization of earlier developments may experience a political
backlash against growth because of adverse transportation, environmental,
school, or recreational conditions arising from cumulative impacts. With
existing capital facility deficits, local governments may not wish to ap-
prove projects that internalize only new harms.2 69 The nexus requirement
bans creative deals in which, instead of mitigating the impact, the property
owner provides some unconnected and less expensive but politically popu-
lar offset.27°
To illustrate this dynamic, consider the facts of Nollan and Dolan. In
the former, the Court held that the coastal commission could not permissi-
bly require the lateral beach easement on the assumption that it would
mitigate the adverse psychological impacts on the public of a larger beach
and any regulatory givings to the property owner as part of its mathematical estimate of rough
proportionality.) A community that benefits from a development can therefore still require costly
mitigation of the development's harms, even where the cost of mitigation is less than the community's
benefits, so long as the mitigation meets the nexus and proportionality requirements. Put another way,
"under Dolan, a 'proportional' solution need only be proportional to gross harms, not net harms,
generated by the development." Id. at 33-34, 38. From the property owner's perspective, this
formulation, too, constitutes a form of government rent seeking that results in overregulation.
267. See Been, supra note 13, at 543-44.
268. See Fennell, supra note 18, at 31; William A. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use
Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 101-05 (1987).
269. See Dahlstrom, supra note 186, at 568.
270. See Kayden, supra note 266, at 47-48; Fischel, supra note 268, at 105. Nollan's nexus
requirement limits the scope of exactions bargaining, even when a court might agree that the unrelated
offset passes Dolan's rough proportionality test by costing apparently the same or less than the harm
the new land use would produce. See COOTER, supra note 60, at 302; FISCHEL, supra note 18, at 348-
49. William Fischel has proposed that limiting the community's initial entitlements to the cost of
eliminating nuisance spillovers and protecting such entitlements by a property rule would lead local
governments and property owners to negotiate to maximize each other's benefits, especially where
mitigation will be expensive and imperfect. Fischel, supra note 268, at 109.
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house. In dicta, the Court suggested that the commission permissibly could
have denied the application or required dedication of a public viewing spot.
Assume (as is in fact likely) that the viewing spot, located at the front of
the property and inviting the public to peer beside or over the house to the
beach, would be more burdensome and intrusive to the property owners,
and less appealing to the community, than would the beach easement. And
yet the viewing spot apparently would pass constitutional muster under
Nollan.271 Thus, following Nollan, the commission has three safe
choices: (1) require a viewing spot, (2) deny the project, or (3) approve the
project without conditions. If the commission is concerned about an ap-
proval without conditions and fears that by suggesting the beach easement
it will face constitutional liability, it is likely to either deny the permit or
require a viewing spot. In either instance, the property owner is worse off;
assuming that neither the commission nor the public prefers the viewing
spot, all parties are worse off.272 Although Dolan's quantitative metric
might protect property owners, Nollan blocks mutually beneficial bargain-
ing by imposing a qualitative logic. Similarly, assume that, following
Dolan, the decision makers in the City of Tigard know they cannot condi-
tion expansion of the hardware store on a bike path because, lacking a suf-
ficient nexus (hardware store customers rarely ride bikes to the store) and
proportionality, it would not pass muster under Nollan and Dolan. If voters
prefer either a larger hardware store with a bike path or a smaller hardware
store with no bike path to a larger hardware store with no bike path but in-
creased automobile capacity, then decision makers are likely to deny the
property owner's request to expand the hardware store. In such instances,
Dolan leaves property owners in a worse position than if they could simply
agree to the condition.
The facts of Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco and Justice
Scalia's dissent to the Court's denial of certiorari demonstrate this dynamic
as well by showing what would happen if the Court expanded its exactions
rules to reach denial of an approval after failed negotiations.273 In Lambert,
San Francisco denied the property owner's project because the owner was
unwilling to pay a fee the city sought in order to mitigate the project's pro-
jected impacts.274 Suppose Justice Scalia could persuade a majority of the
Court to extend the nexus and proportionality tests to such rejected condi-
tions. In response, many local governments would likely choose not to risk
offering exactions at all rather than face liability for conditions they offer.
271. Whether such a viewing spot would pass constitutional muster under Dolan's proportionality
test is a separate issue that the Court never reached in Nollan and never addressed in Dolan.
272. See Dana, supra note 18, at 1277-82 (providing examples that demonstrate the potential
inefficiency of nexus and proportionality); Fennell, supra note 18, at 31; Kayden, supra note 266, at
47-48.
273. See 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1045 (2000).
274. 529 U.S, 1045, 1045 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Of those risk-averse jurisdictions, many will still have the political will
simply to deny the projects on which they could not propose conditions. In
such instances, the property owner is significantly worse off than if she
could bargain freely with the local government over conditions that might
win an approval.
Risk-averse jurisdictions that otherwise would be willing to bargain to
an approval are likely to deny a proposal that threatens to create harms
when denial carries less risk of constitutional liability. This result is likely
when political decision makers are more willing to frustrate a property
owner's interests than to force the public to bear the costs of development.
To the extent that property owners would be willing to agree to exactions
that fail the logic and metrics of nexus and proportionality, the Court's ef-
forts to protect property rights ultimately lead local governments to dimin-
ish owners' ability to develop their property.
275
C. Consequence 3: No Effect Due to Noncompliance
Finally, some jurisdictions simply ignore the Court's rule formalism
by bargaining outside the constitutionally required parameters of nexus and
proportionality. Extra-legal bargaining is a likely result when a majority
within the community demonstrates a strong political will for strict land
use regulation, whether to protect an important amenity (such as coastline,
a body of water, or attractive open space), to address existing infrastructure
deficits, or to exclude others from the community. In jurisdictions willing
to bear the risk of imposing unconstitutional exactions on development,
property owners and developers will find it easier and faster to agree to the
exaction and thus receive an available entitlement.276 When local govern-
ments engage in this kind of bargaining, the Court's takings formalism has
failed to curb the regulation it declared unconstitutional.
275. 1 do not mean to suggest that open-ended bargaining for concessions will necessarily result in
more effective regulation. Assume, for example, that the Court removed Nollan's qualitative limits but
retained Dolan's quantitative metric and thereby enabled more freewheeling bargaining to ensue over
concessions. The resulting bargains, and judicial review of those results, may be unable to consider the
extent to which an exaction is equivalent to the required mitigation. That is, once bargaining is freed
from any connection to the harms of the new development, neither the property owner nor the
municipality and its citizens--especially those most subject to the proposed development's harms-
may be able to estimate the fairness of a bargain. See Fennell, supra note 18, at 32 n. 123 (arguing that
nexus and rough proportionality must be linked because "[t]he nexus requirement keeps the bargaining
chips in a common metric so that they can be counted, while rough proportionality requires that the
chips be tallied up with at least rough accuracy"); cf id. at 32 n.122 (positing that Nollan by itself
might actually provide sufficient protection to property owners while enabling sufficient flexibility and
range of possible exactions to encourage mutually beneficial bargaining); Lars Noah, Administrative
Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 873, 916
(noting the value of a Nollan-based germaneness requirement in checking excessive federal
administrative arm-twisting).
276. See COOTER, supra note 60, at 299-302.
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Consider, for example, efforts by the city of Livermore, California,
and surrounding Alameda County to utilize long-term, coordinated plan-
ning techniques and development agreements with residential developers to
promote local grape growing for wine manufacturing. The South
Livermore Valley Area Plan requires property owners or developers seek-
ing to develop residential subdivisions to contribute land and fees to
support the preservation, promotion, and expansion of vineyards and wine-
making facilities in an area that is both well suited and historically signifi-
cant for viticulture. 7 By requiring dedications and fees from developers in
exchange for discretionary approvals to build on the limited supply of de-
velopable land, Livermore unabashedly trades entitlements to promote
what it sees as the economic, environmental, and aesthetic advantages of
local agriculture in the wine-producing region of Northern California.278 In
requiring dedication of land for vineyards, the plan makes no distinction
between previously undeveloped land and that being used for vineyards at
the time of development.2 79 Therefore, Livermore would struggle to prove
an essential nexus between the impacts from development and the condi-
tions for approval under the plan. Nevertheless, despite the plan's promul-
gation after Nollan and its continued reliance upon development
agreements that lack the demonstrations of rough proportionality required
by Dolan, developers have agreed to Livermore's conditions, in part be-
cause of the city's location within commuting distance of the East Bay, San
Francisco, and Silicon Valley. To date, no developer seeking approvals has
refused to sign the required development agreements or brought a constitu-
tional challenge against the exactions.28 °
The dynamic at work in Livermore is more probable when a local
government and a property owner sufficiently trust each other and when
the benefit of the approval or development agreement is sufficient for the
property owner to bear an exaction that may be unconnected to, or may
cost more than, the harms the proposed land use would create.28' Sufficient
277. See Alameda County, Cal., South Livermore Valley Area Plan 3-8 (Feb. 23, 1993).
278. See City of Livermore, South Livermore Valley Specific Plan Model Development
Agreement and Preannexation Agreement 1-4 (June 14, 1999).
279. See, e.g., City of Livermore, South Livermore Valley Specific Plan 4-10 to 4-19 (describing
"existing land use settings" for two defined subareas, only a portion of which was used for vineyards)
(amended Feb. 16, 2001).
280. As of December 2003, Livermore had signed thirteen development agreements and approved
sixteen tentative maps under the South Livermore Valley Area Plan, all of which included agricultural
easement conditions. To date, no developer has filed a suit challenging these conditions. Email from
Richard S. Taylor, attorney for City of Livermore to Mark Fenster, Assistant Professor of Law, Levin
College of Law, University of Florida (Dec. 14, 2003, 10:31 A.M.) (on file with author).
281. See Frederik Jacobsen & Craig MeHenry, Exactions on Development Permission, in
WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 342, 348 (Donald G.
Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978); see also Ryan, supra note 60, at 367 (reporting interview
with planner in Cincinnati who observed that "bargaining was driven underground after Dolan" into
meetings with staff to negotiate mutually agreeable exactions).
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trust is especially likely between parties that transact business repeatedly
with each other. "Repeat-playing" developers, who expect to interact again
with a local government or hope to avoid a regional reputation for being
litigious, are provided incentives to waive their constitutional claims to
obtain fast approvals and cultivate a long-term relationship with the local
government.282 New entrants into a local or regional property development
market may lack such an established relationship with regulators and thus
may not be offered noncompliant exactions. This dynamic would adversely
affect the competitiveness of the local land development industry and the
quality and price of products offered. Accordingly, the exactions decisions
produce inefficient results by leading local governments to favor certain
individuals in the entitlement trading process.
Thus, even if we assume that the nexus and proportionality tests
would successfully protect the most vulnerable small property owners
(such as the plaintiffs in Nollan and Dolan) from extortionate overregula-
tion, the Court's exactions decisions fail to impose standard, universal pro-
tection sufficient to achieve this goal. Developers in Livermore know that
regulatory approval requires vineyards and thus willingly provide them
without filing suit. If a developer accepted the condition and then filed suit,
Livermore-like local governments would either limit the program to those
the city could trust not to challenge the conditions-in which case new en-
trants into the market and consumers would suffer-or shut down the pro-
gram-in which case property owners and developers generally would
suffer. The Court, which sought to provide landowners with a shield
against such practices, misunderstands land use practices and the efficacy
of its own rule-formalist efforts. Its efforts to limit the authority of rent-
seeking local governments leads to perverse results in land use regulation
and property development.
In too many of the common scenarios in which governments impose
exactions, the exactions decisions either fail to protect or overprotect prop-
erty rights. As a result, they help create inefficient and unfair regulation.
The Court's efforts to formalize judicial review and establish uniform pro-
tections leave property owners, residents, and insufficiently protected envi-
ronmental resources vulnerable to regulatory approaches skewed in
response to nexus and proportionality requirements. The Court's efforts do
not necessarily improve the bottom-line results of exactions, and in some
instances they actually impede better, more flexible concessions and
282. Dana, supra note 18, at 1294-99; cf Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements After Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission, 22 URB. LAW. 23, 50-55 (1990) (noting potential for abuse of
development agreements by developers who shut out competing property owners by purchasing vested
rights).
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regulatory practices that are more efficient and legitimate for the affected
parties and for the general public.
V
TAKINGS FORMALISM AND THE NARROWING OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND
PROPERTY RELATIONS
Part IV considered the effects of the exactions decisions on the sub-
stantive exactions local governments impose. This Part focuses on the de-
cisions' effects on how local governments consider and impose those
exactions. As an inherently political and administrative tool for flexibly
resolving land use disputes, exactions offer especially important means of
enabling legitimate and effective responses to proposed development. The
Court's strong emphasis on individual rights and its secondary emphasis on
utilitarian conceptions of regulatory efficiency fail to consider the conflict-
ing conceptions of local government and property, and block property's
role in promoting political and social relationships within a broader com-
munity. 83 Takings formalism and regulatory formulas limit the political
ground upon which affected parties activate democratic institutions and
processes by voicing their claims, and frustrate the role that the social em-
beddedness of property ownership plays in establishing a functional com-
munity.
This Part elaborates on what is lost as a result of the Court's takings
formalism and regulatory formulas. It focuses on the role of land use
within local politics and on exactions as an open-ended, flexible means of
achieving a political and administrative compromise to the disputes that
arise over development. Some state and local communities at times choose
rights-based and utilitarian approaches to resolve development issues, but
others prefer, and would be better served by, more inclusive means of de-
bating and collectively resolving land use disputes. The Court's rule-like
principles, however, put communities that prefer more open-ended political
and negotiated processes at risk of liability for compensation.
A. Takings Formalism, Political Contest, and Land Use Decision Making
In its exactions decisions, the Court limited the judiciary's role in re-
viewing challenged exactions to evaluating the extent of an exaction's pre-
cision. Absent from the Court's logic and metrics is any consideration of
the political and social context of the bargain, the fairness and openness of
283. A useful introduction to conceptions of property as political and social relations is Stephen R.
Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF
PROPERTY 36 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); see also Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The
Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 331-33
(2002) (attempting to complicate and reconceptualize property theory in terms of environment and
social context).
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the proceedings leading to the exaction, or the long-term relationship
among community members.284 Put another way, the Court has made it
constitutionally irrelevant whether the political process by which the con-
cession and entitlement were derived and exchanged was fair or open to the
concerns of all affected parties. All that matters, ultimately, is whether the
resulting bargain meets the Court's logic and metrics. Moreover, in states
and federal circuits in which legislatively imposed exactions avoid height-
ened scrutiny, local governments have even stronger incentives to avoid
bargaining and individualized conditions by relying on regulatory formu-
las. Accordingly, the Court's constitutional exactions regime pushes local
governments that seek to comply with exactions rules to adopt preconsti-
tuted formulas that are more likely to meet or avoid the constitutionally
required logic and metrics of the nexus and proportionality tests. Formulas
are inevitably safer and more attractive regulatory approaches for local
governments than are open-ended political contests, with their attendant
political compromises.
The Court has chosen to ignore the extent to which open-ended land
use regulatory processes can enable robust, legitimate, and inclusive local
politics, a context that may yield substantively better resolutions than ab-
stract, preconstituted formulas can to complicated and intractable local dis-
putes. 285 Local land use conflicts, and decisions about the distribution of
land use entitlements and the costs of development, are inherently and
deeply political. State law often enables political inclusion and participa-
tion by imposing constitutional procedural due process requirements and
statutory requirements that affected parties be afforded notice and opportu-
nity to be heard, 286 and by imposing requirements that local governments
hold open meetings.287 Indeed, democratic decision making may be not
only helpful or beneficial but also necessary for a functional community.
When decision-making processes enable the inclusion, debate, and com-
promise of fundamentally opposed positions within the complicated matrix
of personal, social, environmental, and fiscal issues central to local
284. See Dagan, supra note 217, at 774-78; Michelman, supra note 120, at 1248. Both of these
elements--context and relationship-would be considered under Penn Central's consideration of
whether the regulation relates to "promotion of the general welfare" and provides an "average
reciprocity of advantage" to all affected property owners. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 131, 140 (1978).
285. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 5-6 (2000) ("The normative
legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to which those affected by it have been
included in the decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes.").
286. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-12 (West 2003) (requiring notice to neighboring
property owners of public hearings concerning certain planning and zoning decisions); Horn v. County
of Ventura, 596 P.2d 1134, 1141 (Cal. 1979) (applying federal due process standards to evaluate the
adequacy of notice to adjoining landowners); see also J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Statute or Ordinance Provisions Requiring Notice as Prerequisite to Granting Variance
or Exception to Zoning Requirement, 38 A.L.R.3d 167 (1971).
287. See MANDELKER, supra note 62, § 6.76.
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government, they play an important function in identifying and allowing
contest over issues of local importance.288 Open, inclusive, and substantive
political contests over important land use decisions are likely to increase
the loyalty of residents who, as a result of their participation or faith in the
political processes of their local government, consider themselves part of a
responsive and open community.289
An exactions process that avoids the inevitably political questions
about trade-offs between property owners and the community merely frus-
trates citizens' desires to be involved in land use decisions, thereby con-
tributing to a sense of disillusionment and demoralization regarding public
life.29' Neighbors and activists are more likely to support, or at least reduce
their opposition to, a project that includes conditions that address their
concerns. Similarly, as evidenced by slow-growth communities such as
Livermore, California, that succeed in ignoring the nexus and proportional-
ity tests, many property owners and developers would prefer to engage in
political horse trading and creative bargaining through exactions rather
than face outright denials of development applications. When, by contrast,
constitutional rules and regulatory formulas limit political participation in
land use decisions to the demand that decision makers either approve or
deny a project, rule formalism reduces or eliminates exactions as a negoti-
ated political solution. Lacking flexible tools for negotiation, local
288. On the values of local participatory democracy at the municipal level, see Gerald E. Frug,
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1057, 1070-72 (1980). In this context, I use "local" to
refer not merely to the physical boundaries of cities but to the more complicated communities that exist
in neighborhoods within cities and in relationships between cities and suburbs in a larger metropolitan
region. Jurisdictional governments make land use decisions, but when the terms of and debate about
those decisions are constitutionally and administratively limited by cases such as Nollan and Dolan,
they are more likely to exclude the concerns of smaller and larger social units within and across a single
jurisdiction. See Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 470-72 (2001)
(complicating simplistic presumptions that the "local" equates with jurisdictional boundaries).
289. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 202, at 15-17. Furthermore, if as part of their response to Nollan
and Dolan all local governments within a region adopt relatively uniform, formulaic land use regimes,
these jurisdictions' sameness blunts the threat and promise of exit for the politically disenfranchised. Id.
at 124. Local and regional governments that negate or blunt voice and exit especially constrain and
frustrate political involvement and loyalty, Hirschman suggests. Ideally, well-balanced regions provide
opportunities not only for political dissent but, when voice is ineffective, for the ability to exit to
jurisdictions that offer distinct political, social, and cultural offerings. Id. at 125. The proper mix of
voice and exit creates loyalty among residents who are willing to trade the promise of exit for the
uncertain possibilities of political change. Id. at 77.
290. See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 19, at 152-54. The demoralization of existing residents
represents the reverse scenario from that identified by Frank Michelman as one of the costs of land use
regulation requiring consideration for a taking. See Michelman, supra note 120, at 1214-17; cf Poirier,
supra note 1, at 182-83 (positing a notion of reverse demoralization of those adversely affected by a
jurisdiction's decision to maintain the status quo in response to property owners' political and legal
opposition to new regulation). Michelman defined the "demoralization costs" that should be balanced
to decide whether compensation is necessary as the total of the dollar value necessary to offset
disutilities of losers and their sympathizers and the present value of lost future production from
property owners and their sympathizers who change their behavior in reaction to the perceived
unfairness caused by a regulatory act. Michelman, supra note 120, at 1214.
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regulators are more likely to face disputants who are overcommitted to an
absolute political position.29 ' As Albert Hirschman has noted, absolute po-
litical battles in which participants enter with an uncompromising dedica-
tion to a single issue produce a deep disappointment in the battles'
losers.29 And when such disappointment leads to a sense among property
owners, neighbors, or political activists that the government's failure to
consider and represent their concerns is institutionalized, the resulting dis-
appointment will lead to a retreat from public life. Political withdrawal is
particularly likely when the emotional, financial, and time costs of partici-
pating in the local regulatory and political process generate no return for
the community or for property owners.29 3 In this context, administrative
efficiency substitutes for and suppresses political and social activity.
Disabling political contest over exactions thus broadly impacts de-
mocratic politics. Recent work in public finance theory has identified pub-
lic engagement in localized decision making on the provision of public
services, as opposed to large-scale, hierarchical commands from a central-
ized metropolitan government, as an essential element in the development
of an efficient local public economy.2 94 Because local citizen choice-"the
constitutive principle of American local government"-succeeds over the
long term only through the ongoing investment of community members in
governance and in the development of a community's civic virtue, locali-
ties are often willing to bear the high transaction costs associated with
fragmented and individualized decision making by small units of govern-
ment. 95 Viewed in this context, negotiated land use decisions are an essen-
tial aspect of contemporary local American governance, an excellent
opportunity for individual stakeholders to seek political and social in-
volvement in an accessible set of institutions, and an integral aspect of the
creation of a functional local public economy.296
Politicization of land use regulation has even broader external bene-
fits. Community members' participation in the land use process demon-
strates a level of engagement often lacking in contemporary federal and
state politics. 97 Land use politics in this sense is a gateway toward political
291. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS 119 (1982).
292. Id. at 104-05, 111.
293. Id. at 79-80, 93, 102, 129.
294. See OAKERSON, supra note 202, at 106-24.
295. Id. at 116-17.
296. See Lea S. VanderVelde, Local Knowledge, Legal Knowledge, and Zoning Law, 75 IOWA L.
REV. 1057, 1075 (1990).
297. See generally MATTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, DOWNSIZING
DEMOCRACY: HOW AMERICA SIDELINED ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC 189-93, 240
(2002) (contrasting citizens' disengagement with politics caused by centralized, institutional remedies
to political problems, such as those used by the mainstream environmental movement, with political
engagement in localized NIMBYism and land use political battles); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 344-46 (2000) (arguing that
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activism generally and toward ongoing participation on different sides of
land use and environmental debates specifically. Withdrawing or limiting
exactions as an outlet for political debate and compromise therefore not
only may affect the local issues surrounding a development project but
may also lead to wider disengagement from even the most lively and prom-
ising contemporary political forum.
The value of political contest and compromise over individualized,
negotiated exactions lies in what Frank Michelman has called the
"generative tension" between popular democratic rule and individual prop-
erty ownership.298 The exactions decisions' constitutional rule and adminis-
trative consequences diminish this tension. The Court's narrow concern
with abstract conceptions of prepolitical property rights-rights removed
from the historical situatedness of political institutions and practices-
insulates property from political decision making and sees political dis-
putes over property rights as dangers to avoid rather than as an integrative
process for democracy and individual rights.299 Formulaic quantification
for its own sake or to meet constitutional standards may lead to a shaping
of environmental and planning values based solely on that which can be
quantified rather than on the interests of the community. 00 Overreliance on
expertise and efficiency crowds out democratic values.0 1
citizens' civic engagement in land use disputes and responses by local government are likely to raise
social capital).
298. Michelman, supra note 255, at 1110.
299. See NEDELSKY, supra note 42, at 209-10. See also NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND
THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 112-13, 192-93 (1994) (contrasting decentralized local legal autonomy
and discretion, which enable the construction of a locally specific sense of place, with legal and
economic centralization of power within higher, nonlocal levels of government, which are more likely
to result in the construction of reproducible, homogeneous space).
300. See JOSEPH R. DESJARDINS, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 4-5 (3d ed. 1993); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the
Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000).
301. See CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 95-96 (2000). See also GERALD E.
FRuG, CITY MAKING 22-23 (1999) (challenging the role of experts and an unelected bureaucracy in
making decisions essential to local democratic legitimacy and process). But cf Charles M. Haar &
Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2158 (2002) (arguing for a return to Progressive-era deference to expertise).
This critique of natural rights in property and utilitarian instrumentalism is analogous to critiques
of deliberative democracy and communitarianism. In Stanley Fish's words, for example,
communitarians "replace large P Politics-the clash between fundamentally incompatible visions and
agendas-with small p politics-the adjustment through procedural rules of small differences within a
field from which the larger substantive differences have been banished." Stanley Fish, Mission
Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2298-99
(1997); see also MouFFE, supra, at 93 (criticizing communitarians' "attempt at insulating politics from
the effects of the pluralism of value, this time by trying to fix once and for all the meaning and
hierarchy of the central liberal-democratic values"); MARK REINHARDT, THE ART OP BEING FREE:
TAKING LIBERTIES WITH TOCQUEVILLE, MARX, AND ARENDT 15-16 (1997) (criticizing communitarians
for evading politics by deploying conceptions of the wholeness of a community to which all can and
should belong to obscure the question of politics and power).
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Political contest is not immune to failure or unfairness. In some con-
texts, democratic decision making may be dangerous and inefficient.
Political decision making processes allow the eruption of intense conflict
among factions and individuals that can disrupt and even destroy social ties
and networks. Participants' interests in disputes may be parochial, even
inequitable and exclusionary.3"' But such conflict can itself be an important
means by which a locality or region identifies especially significant issues
it must face rather than suppress.3"3 And where dangerously or unfairly pa-
rochial, inequitable, and exclusionary interests prevail, judicial and state
and federal legislative bodies have essential roles in correcting local politi-
cal errors-roles that state courts played in sensitive and variable ways be-
fore the Court's exactions decisions and that state legislatures continue to
play today.
Nor does privileging political contest require excluding formulaic,
instrumental methods when they are appropriate. Such methods can solve
disputes or aspects of disputes, especially when, within a specific political
context, exactions would likely effect an extortion of an individual's prop-
erty rights or would result in insufficient internalization of development
costs because development interests capture decision makers. Legislatively
imposed exaction formulas also provide a level of cost certainty and ad-
ministrative efficiency that individualized exactions and complex negotia-
tions, by definition, do not. When a project is uncontroversial and will have
minimal impacts on those outside the jurisdiction, and the local community
enjoys a relatively strong consensus over how and to what extent new land
uses should be regulated, formulas represent an essential regulatory tool.
The same is true when a specific type of impact is knowable and quantifi-
able and means for its mitigation are replicable and effective on different
parcels.
Nevertheless, dispute is often at the core of politics, and political
contest is an important means to resolve disputes if the local political
302. The most famous example of parochial local tendencies to exclude disfavored projects and
groups is the Mount Laurel trilogy of cases issued by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See S. Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel (Mt. Laurel 1), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (invalidating an
exclusionary zoning ordinance as a violation of state constitutional due process and equal protection
guarantees); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel (Mt. Laurel 1I), 456 A.2d 390
(N.J. 1983) (enumerating criteria for communities' "fair share" of affordable housing and providing
remedies to builders affected by restrictive regulatory barriers); Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of
Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986) (upholding the constitutionality of the Fair Housing Act and
Council on Affordable Housing, which assumed enforcement of much of the lingering Mount Laurel
litigation). The literature on Mount Laurel is vast; two useful summaries are Paula A. Franzese, Mount
Laurel Ill: The New Jersey Supreme Court's Judicious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 30 (1988),
and John M. Payne, General Welfare and Regional Planning: How the Law of Unintended
Consequences and the Mount Laurel Doctrine Gave New Jersey a Modern State Plan, 73 ST. JOHN's L.
REV. 1103 (1999).
303. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Societies, in A
PROPENSITY TO SELF-SUBVERSION 231, 241-43 (1995).
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context allows for a fair and inclusive contest.3" Formulaic exactions
purged of individualized political dispute may protect property owners
from the vicissitudes of increased political participation and power by a
majority opposed to development, but their removal also eliminates the
inclusion, contingency, and openness that might be found in the deal
making of political compromise.3"5 Politics "consists of practices of
settlement and unsettlement, of disruption and administration, of
extraordinary events or foundings and mundane maintenances" 3 6-it
consists, that is, of the ebb and flow of dispute.3"7 To rely merely on formal
rules and regulatory formulas is to lose an essential characteristic of local
land use regulatory processes. These processes include a "web of
community understandings-sometimes highly idiosyncratic-about the
way things ought to be done."3 °8 They are also constituted by the
idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of local public life, which may attract or
repel residents and should, assuming no abrupt changes, allow those who
are repelled to exit.3"9 The Takings Clause serves to protect individuals
unduly subjected to the harmful effects of abrupt changes in land use
regulation. But formalistic rules and administrative formulas intended to
animate the Takings Clause in a flexible land use regulatory regime do
more than protect property owners. They foreclose political resolutions to
political disputes. They undervalue the creative possibilities of compromise
and overvalue a promised haven from democratic contest, unfairness, and
inefficiencies through expertise and the judicial protection of prepolitical
rights.31° And they ultimately replace the educational and transformative
capacity of law and politics within the social institutions of local
government and local communities with the abstractions of nexus and
proportionality and of numerical harms and costs.31'
304. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Deliberative Democracy's Attempt to Turn Politics into Law,
65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 123-24 (2002).
305. See BARBARA CRUIKSHANK, THE WILL TO EMPOWER 2-4 (1999); HIRSCHMAN, supra note
202, at 15-17, 124.
306. BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS 205 (1993); see
also MOUFFE, supra note 301, at 99-105 (advocating political institutions enabling a vibrant contest of
democratic political positions that make room for dissent, that do not guarantee particular results in
advance, and that invite a pluralism of voices).
307. See William E. Connolly, Politics and Vision, in DEMOCRACY AND VISION: SHELDON WOLIN
AND THE VICISSITUDES OF THE POLITICAL 3, 15-16 (Aryeh Botwinick & William E. Connolly eds.,
2001) (arguing against the control of "democratic spontaneity" by tight sets of "moral principles,
constitutional rules, corporate dictates, or normative codes").
308. Rose, supra note 204, at 95.
309. Id. at 96-98, 101.
310. See F.R. ANKERSMIT, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 197-210 (2002).
311. See Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1421, 1435,
1446 (2000) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM (1999)).
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B. Takings Formalism and Local Dispute Resolution
Exactions can play a mediating role in the land development process.
They enable interested parties to trade entitlements in pursuit of mutually
beneficial results and help bring about community-based resolutions of
contested land use disputes. Indeed, by allowing negotiated compromise
through creative, open-ended bargaining when consensus cannot be
reached, individualized exactions are the necessary correlative to the inevi-
table and necessary political disputes that surround land use decision mak-
ing.31 Bargaining over individualized exactions is consistent with the open
norms necessary to successful mediation because it provides an appropri-
ate, flexible package of conditions and entitlements that respond to the par-
ticular concerns of property owners, government officials, and interested
members of the community.3 13 Whether overseen by the local government,
or by the judiciary,3 14 an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) profes-
sional,3"5 or an independent local official, 16 a negotiation process may be
especially important and successful in local land use disputes when dispu-
tants have ongoing relationships and where a limited universe of interested
parties might enable all or a majority to reach some form of consensus on
the terms of an agreement.3" 7 Negotiation by property owners and local
governments over the exchange of entitlements is more likely to reach a
mutually agreeable solution when parties can consider a wide universe of
terms as part of a bargain than when the negotiation is limited in scope by
formal rules imposed and enforced by external judicial agents.
312. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 166 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
According to Habermas,
The compromises achieved by... bargaining [between diverse, success-oriented parties who
are willing to cooperate] contain a negotiated agreement... that balances conflicting
interests. Whereas a rationally motivated consensus ... rests on reasons that convince all the
parties in the same way, a compromise can be accepted by the different parties each for its
own different reasons.
Id; see also HIRSCHMAN, supra note 303, at 243 (noting the significance of social conflict in requiring
both bargaining and arguing to reach effective resolution).
313. See Rose, supra note 5 1, at 89 1.
314. See Hon. Richard S. Cohen et al., Settling Land Use Litigation While Protecting the Public
Interest: Whose Lawsuit Is This Anyway?, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 844, 848-49 (1993) (advocating an
active role for judges in overseeing negotiated settlements of land use litigation and protecting the
public from agencies that may bargain away their duty to enforce existing law without fully explaining
their motives in reaching the agreement during or after the process).
315. On the development of institutionalized land use dispute resolution programs in state
governments, universities, independent commissions, and private consultants, see LAWRENCE
SUSSKIND ET AL., USING ASSISTED NEGOTIATION TO SETTLE LAND USE DISPUTES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR
PUBLIC OFFICIALS 24-25 (1999); Jonathan M. Davidson & Susan L. Trevarthen, Land Use
Mediation: Another Smart Growth Alternative, 33 URB. LAW. 705 (2001).
316. See Ryan, supra note 60, at 386-88 (proposing a "third-party deputy" distinct from the
property owner and decision-making authority to oversee mediation).
317. See WILLIAM FULTON, REACHING CONSENSUS IN LAND-USE NEGOTIATIONS 12 (1989)
(explaining that seemingly small disputes over land development can escalate into large political
struggles if they are inadequately or insufficiently resolved through negotiations among the parties).
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External limits adversely affect more than the possibility of an imme-
diate resolution. When the resolution to a land use conflict emerges from
negotiation rather than from the administrative imposition of a legislated,
predetermined formula, a decision to allow development can appear more
legitimate. The collective process by which the result was reached enables
all sides ultimately to support, or at least not to block, the agreement to
allow development.3"8 The resolution may be substantively better to the
extent that the sides are able to communicate information about the pro-
posal and their concerns and interests to each other, either directly or
through a third party, and thus come to some understanding of their respec-
tive needs and expectations." 9 A negotiated resolution may also be more
secure in the future. When an unforeseen event or impact arises, a prior
negotiated resolution-especially among repeat players in a land use game
with long-term relationships, such as developers, local governments, and
political majorities-may enable inexpensive nonlegal adjustments in a
good faith effort to preserve an ongoing consensus. By contrast, when new
events or impacts call into question decisions imposed judicially or admin-
istratively, landowners are more likely to consider the prior result as de-
claring a binding entitlement and are more likely to litigate than to
negotiate as a result.32 Finally, negotiated solutions are generally less ex-
pensive and more amicable than litigation and administrative appeals over
complicated and contentious legal and factual issues. 2 '
This argument about administrative formulas is consistent with simi-
lar claims about the role of what Carol Rose has called the "muddy" and
"crystal" rules in property law.322 For Rose, muddy rules (or standards)
characterize a recurring tendency within doctrinal cycles to shift toward
"fuzzy, ambiguous rules of decision" and away from clear, crystal rules
(only, at other times, to shift back again).3 23 A benefit of vague and open-
ended muddy rules, Rose argues, is their mimicry of negotiations and
318. Deakin, supra note 188, at 108; cf Richard H. Cowart, Negotiating Exactions Through
Development Agreements, in PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 176, at 219, 231-32
(warning that development agreements may "insulat[e] development decisions from citizen review,
opposition, or revocation" where governments and developers exclude citizen concerns from the
negotiation and review process); Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the
Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 110 (2000) (explaining a "legitimacy benefit" of
negotiated environmental rule making).
319. See KOMESAR, supra note 206, at 138-39; Freeman & Langbein, supra note 318, at 110-12;
Christian Hunold & Iris Marion Young, Justice, Democracy, and Hazardous Siting, 46 POL. STUD. 82
(1998); cf Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (1999) (arguing that
"muddy" standards can lead to more efficient results by forcing parties to bargain with each other
without the certainty as to which of them holds the legal entitlement).
320. KOMESAR, supra note 206, at 139 (citing Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963)).
321. See Wegner, supra note 62, at 960.
322. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
323. Id. at 578.
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communication within long-term, situated relationships and a commu-
nity.324 As such, according to Marc Poirier, the rhetorical and jurispruden-
tial power of muddy rules' vagueness arises from how it "allows and forces
citizens to participate in societal discourse" and to consider the terms of
any judicial, political, or administrative resolution in a manner that is fair
to all parties concerned.325 Crystal rules, whether imposed by the judiciary
(as in Nollan and Dolan) or by legislatures and administrators (as in regu-
latory formulas for exactions), may protect especially vulnerable individu-
als but are opposed to, and may inhibit, individualized and collective
decision making.
Negotiated land use decision making and dispute resolution do not
work under certain circumstances3. 6 and in practice may not be as inclusive
and participatory as they appear in theory.3"7 Certain communities at cer-
tain moments-such as when parties cannot trust each other to bargain in
good faith or when weak political leadership fails to oversee and mediate
negotiation, or when an interested party has captured the body overseeing
regulation-may lack the willingness, ability, and information to negotiate
fairly and inclusively. When negotiations are limited, property owners or
the larger community may agree, or be compelled to agree, to an unfair or
unwise compromise. Judicial review in such instances would impose a
proper check on the resulting bargain and the process by which it was
reached.3 28 But to the extent that the exactions decisions shrink the universe
324. Id. at 602-03. See also Radin, supra note 23, at 270 (arguing that in deciding takings cases
courts engage in "the pragmatic practice of situated judgment in light of both partial principles and the
unique particularities of each case").
325. Poirier, supra note 1, at 190.
326. See SUSSKIND ET AL., supra note 315, at 3, 23 (concluding, based on a survey of participants
in one hundred communities that had engaged in negotiated settlements of land use disputes, that
mediation does not work when, among other conditions, participants do not recognize the other side's
rights, the party providing financial support insists on controlling the mediation process, and one or
more parties to the dispute are most interested in setting precedents for future legal or administrative
disputes or are using the process to delay real action or to create an illusion that something is being
done).
327. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., MEDIATING LAND USE DISPUTES: PROS AND CONS 13
(2000) (summarizing criticisms of detractors of assisted negotiation, including claims that negotiation
is neither faster nor less expensive than traditional processes, fails to result in legitimate agreements
and consensus, and ultimately ends in litigation anyway); Michelle Ryan, Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Environmental Cases: Friend or Foe?, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 412-14 (1997)
(summarizing arguments of ADR critics); Michael Wheeler, Negotiating NIMBYs: Learning from the
Failure of the Massachusetts Siting Law, II YALE J. ON REG. 241, 253-54 (1994) (noting and
theorizing about reasons for failure of Massachusetts law intended to aid in siting of locally undesirable
land uses through required negotiation and dispute resolution).
328. As such, the task of judicial review of takings claims begins to resemble that of the actions of
administrative agencies under the Due Process Clause. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., Expropriatory
Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C.
L. REV. 713 (2002) (arguing in favor of shifting claims made currently under the Takings Clause to the
substantive Due Process Clause and reviewing them for intent to expropriate); David A. Westbrook,
Administrative Takings: A Realist Perspective on the Practice and Theory of Regulatory Takings
Cases, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 717, 721 (1999) (analogizing takings claims to claims against
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of potential negotiating points, and to the extent that their consequences
heighten the risk of takings claims and liability, takings formalism may
frustrate efforts to utilize bargaining and negotiation to mediate land use
disputes within the specific context of the affected parties.329
Parallel to the broad benefits of allowing greater political contest in
land use decisions33 are the benefits to the social conception of property
and property rights that result from enabling negotiated settlements to
those disputes. By facilitating a community-based resolution to a political
dispute over property rights, development, and impacts, exactions serve
what Rose has described as the "propriety" version of the Western concep-
tion of private property33' and what Laura Underkuffler has described as
the historically significant "comprehensive" approach to property in
American law. 32 Rather than mere preference satisfaction or utilitarian
consequentialism, the proprietarian version of property emphasizes respon-
sibility and trusteeship by both the property owner and his surrounding
community.333 Rose finds the echoes of this conception of property in mod-
em takings law's flexible, ad hoc balancing of private loss and public bene-
fit.334 Rather than an individualist conception of the exercise and realization
of property rights, Underkuffler's comprehensive approach conceptualizes
property as including "a broad range of human liberties understood within
a collective context of both support and restraint. '335 Formalist and formu-
laic approaches to the law and to the administration of exactions frustrate
this conception of property by substituting logics and metrics for the open-
ended negotiations of situated, affected parties.
CONCLUSION: EXACTIONS, TAKINGS FORMALISM, AND THE FAILURES OF A
BIFURCATED APPROACH TO TAKINGS
The Court's bifurcated approach to the Takings Clause subjects cer-
tain identifiable regulatory acts or results to heightened, formalist judicial
administrative agencies under the rubrics of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and
the great administrative law statutes).
329. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL
APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 87 (1987) (noting the importance of trading
entitlements, rather than merely seeking compromise, in resolving disputes).
330. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
331. Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, 33 NoMos 223 (1991).
332. Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 133-42 (1990).
333. Rose, supra note 331, at 239-40.
334. Id. Others have made similar arguments about the dual nature of American conceptions of
property. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 1-7 (1997); Kevin Gray, Equitable Property, 47
CURRENT LEGAL PRoBs. 157, 208-09 (1994); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public
Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 150 (1971); William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 1335 (1991).
335. Underkuffler, supra note 332, at 141; see also ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY 35-48 (1987)
(describing the mixture of private ownership and public control in modem conceptions of liberty).
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review and provides the majority of regulatory acts more deferential, open-
ended consideration. This approach, which the Court powerfully restated in
Tahoe-Sierra, relies upon two assumptions: first, there is a clear and iden-
tifiable distinction between takings claims that fall within and those that
fall outside of the categorical exceptions, and second, the heightened scru-
tiny of the takings rules these exceptions receive will have direct and dis-
cernible limiting effects on the expropriatory regulations the exceptions are
intended to curb. These assumptions perform a powerful sorting function,
placing government actions into separate categories and then considering
the constitutional requirement for compensation in profoundly different
ways based upon that sorting. At bottom, the broad structure of the Court's
takings decisions assumes that in some instances, at least, government is
per se less trustworthy than in others.
Nollan and Dolan embody these assumptions in their conception of
land use regulation and in their formalist efforts to limit that regulation.
But the Court's exactions rules do not impose the clear doctrinal logic they
promise and do not offer the universal, stable protection for property rights
they seek to provide. At the same time, in their operation in judicial review
and regulatory action, the decisions complicate the bifurcated approach in
two important ways. First, exactions and bargaining are so pervasive that
constitutional rules seeking to curb their use threaten to swallow the en-
tirety of land use regulation. Such would be the case if the Court decided
all of the still-unresolved issues associated with the exactions decisions
expansively, thus making the nexus and proportionality tests applicable to
all decisions that consider exactions requirements.336 Second, in some in-
stances the exactions decisions fail to constrain land use regulation and in
fact create incentives for complete denials of development. In others, they
lead to potentially dangerous and costly underregulation. Categorizing ex-
actions subject to constitutional rule formalism is complicated, and con-
straining exactions uniformly and coherently, and enforcing those
constraints, seems unachievable. Categorical takings formalism and its
Penn Central shadow must operate on a complicated and highly politicized
regulatory ground. The bifurcated approach, in which an emergent catalog
of rules abuts an older set of standards, seems destined to lead proponents
of strong land use regulation to fears of formalist encroachment and like-
wise to lead proponents of property rights protection to bitter disappoint-
ment.
Indeed, this Article has dwelled on the disappointment and frustration
endemic to takings formalism. Justice Scalia suspects that courts and local
governments knowingly and widely disobey the Court's takings rules. In
jurisdictions facing difficult disputes over development, local governments,
property owners, and third parties are dissatisfied with an increasingly
336. See supra Part I.D.
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formalized and formulaic development process. The systematic under- and
overregulation of land use have led in some areas to environmental and
infrastructural regulation and in other areas to underutilization of develop-
able land. The culprit, this Article has argued, may be the Court's takings
formalism as an exception to Penn Central's deferential standards. Protect-
ing individual property owners from the vagaries of political majorities and
regulatory transitions is an essential purpose of contemporary judicial re-
view under the Takings Clause. But the excessive leverage that Nollan's
and Dolan's protective commands provide for all property owners-which
protect them even, in some instances, from bargains they would willingly
make-not only demonstrates the commands' overinclusivity but also
threatens the political, social, environmental, and economic benefits that
land use regulation and undiminished local government can offer. Takings
rules seek to limit the unruly, particularistic, politicized practices of land
use law-practices that inevitably chafe at externally imposed, formalist
constraints. As a general matter, judicial and administrative noncompliance
and frustration with essential nexus and rough proportionality requirements
are not the result of systematic resistance by ideological courts and authori-
tarian, rent-seeking local governments. Rather, noncompliance and frustra-
tion demonstrate the complicated dynamics of localities attempting to
operate in the shadows of takings formalism.
The critique developed here suggests two propositions that I plan to
explore in a future article. First, with respect to exactions rules, the Court
should limit or abandon its takings formalism. At minimum, the Court
should resolve the outstanding issues regarding the applicability of the
nexus and proportionality tests-whether to distinguish dedications and
fees, adjudicative and legislative decision making, and imposed and
offered-but-not-imposed exactions-against the extension of Nollan and
Dolan. Limiting or withdrawing nexus and proportionality as federal con-
stitutional rules will not leave all property owners vulnerable to widespread
extortionate practices that the Court assumes have taken place in the ab-
sence of its takings formalism, and that Justice Scalia and his fellow
Lambert dissenters assume continue to take place despite the Court's ef-
forts. Before the Court involved itself in exactions, state courts had devel-
oped their own approaches to protecting individuals from excessive
regulatory conditions, and state legislatures continue to control the author-
ity of local governments to impose exactions. At the same time, local poli-
tics, jurisdictional competition, and the real estate market discipline
exactions practice. Decisions made at the state and local level better reflect
the variability of the land use context than do consequentalist rules derived
from the bare text of the Fifth Amendment. Allowing states and localities
to experiment with judicial and legislative limits to exactions will enable
more geographically and temporally flexible, democratic, and legitimate
[Vol. 92:609
20041 TAKINGS FORMALISM AND REGULATORY FORMULAS 681
protections for property rights, local infrastructure, public goods provision,
and the environment.
Second, when the Court's bifurcated approach to takings extends be-
yond rudimentary distinctions between regulatory acts and their conse-
quences, it faces an unresolvable conflict with locally administered land
use regulation. Bifurcation assumes that courts and regulators can identify
distinctive land use regulations, such as permanent physical invasions and
exactions, and distinctive consequences, such as total deprivations of value.
Whether a regulation passes constitutional muster therefore depends heav-
ily upon stable distinctions and a judiciary capable of making them. When
such distinctions are obvious and serve to identify extraordinary incidents
of regulation-when, for example, regulators, property owners, and courts
can identify the outlying practice of the state-sponsored occupation of
land-then the bifurcated approach's presumption in favor of heightened
scrutiny is conceptually defensible, easily administered, and likely to result
in the protection of property rights. But when the regulatory practice is at
the core of land use practice and provides critical regulatory, democratic,
and dispute resolution functions that benefit all affected parties, as is the
case with exactions, then the conceptual and practical advantages of the
Court's bifurcated approach fall away. Bifurcation works only when the
distinctions on which it depends are conceptually and consequentially
meaningful. In the absence of such distinctions, advocates and interested
parties on all sides of the takings debates will continue to fulminate about
the frustrating practices of land use regulation and judicial review produced
by the Court's uneven and partial imposition of takings formalism.
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